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FOREWORD 
en years ago, I became Chairman of the Committee of European 
Supervisors (CEBS), the forerunner of the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and, to some extent, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) as a supervisory authority. Today, ten years later, we have seen the 
ECB becoming the solvency supervisor for the eurozone banks. What was 
then an endeavour in cooperation, aimed at fostering the convergence of 
different supervisory cultures, has now turned into a hard-wired single 
supervisory system (although, to be honest, we are still creating that single 
supervisory culture). 
And ten years ago, two thoughts about the process unsettled me. 
Firstly, we were too concentrated on regulation and too little on supervision 
(hence the insistence of the ultimate goal being fostering the convergence of 
supervisory cultures in the EU). Secondly, and most relevant, the need for 
cooperation for the eurozone was greater than for non-eurozone countries. 
As is often the case in Europe, we needed a crisis to jump start what we 
foresaw a decade ago. But that is the dynamic of the EU, and probably of 
other federations as well. 
Unfortunately, it would be foolish to believe that everything has been 
sorted out. Once progress is achieved, new doubts, problems and conflicts 
inevitably arise: What is the role of the EBA in this new world? What will 
National Competent Authorities do de facto and not just de iure? How will the 
ECB interact with the newly established Single Resolution Board? How can 
we ensure that we preserve a single supervisor and, at the same time, keep 
the diverse typology of banks´ business models we currently have in 
Europe? 
This report is an attempt to inform the debate and to offer both answers 
and solutions. 
It has been a pleasure to participate in this collective effort, and I thank 
the participants in the Task Force, Karel Lannoo and the CEPS team for 
making it possible. 
José María Roldán 
Chairman of the Task Force 
Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca 
T
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PREFACE 
ith publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at 
the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) has set 
the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only 
the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-
day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The centralisation of the supervision 
in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming 
months and years ahead. The CEPS Task Force on “ECB Banking 
Supervision and beyond” discussed and analysed these challenges in detail. 
It benefited in its analysis from the research undertaken by CEPS staff on 
bank regulatory and market developments. 
The report begins with an Executive Summary, which presents the 
policy recommendations of the Task Force discussions, reinforced by 
independent research and analysis. 
Chapter 1 examines the structure and developments in the EU banking 
sector in general, and particularly the banks in the eurozone that are subject 
to direct supervision. The EU banking sector remains very diverse in its 
structure, and its performance was heavily affected by the financial crisis. 
The problems that the ECB will encounter in the day-to-day operations 
of the SSM are analysed in chapter 2. Although the SSM Regulation is 
straightforward in the transfer of competences, the performance of the ECB 
as supervisor will be affected by the division of labour with the member 
states, in the overlap of tasks with the European Banking Authority, and in 
the distinction drawn between monetary and supervisory policy functions 
within the ECB itself. 
The two other legs of banking union – the resolution framework and 
the deposit guarantee schemes – are discussed in chapter 3. The adoption of 
the bank resolution and recovery Directive is a huge step forward, and 
provides, along with the single resolution mechanism, the basis for a 
formalised decision-making structure for restructuring and liquidating 
banks in the eurozone. 
W
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The final chapter 4 looks ahead to some supervisory issues on the 
horizon, which are related to the optimal structure for and exercise of 
supervision. It raises the question whether the bank-sovereign nexus has 
been broken – which was the reason why Banking Union was started in the 
first place. 
The report starts with the recommendations of the Task Force, which 
are the result of discussions over three separate meetings in May, July and 
October 2014 at CEPS. The Task Force was chaired by José María Roldán and 
benefited from the input of Task Force members and observers. 
 
Karel Lannoo 
Chief Executive, CEPS 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Exploit the opportunity 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is a quantum step forward 
towards unified licensing and supervising of banks in the EU. The task now 
is for the ECB to smoothen the transition and make the system work and for 
policy-makers to further streamline and simplify the regulatory and 
supervisory structure as well as to bolster macro-prudential supervision. A 
level playing field must be maintained between the significant and less-
significant banks in the SSM, i.e. between both the ‘opt-ins’ and the euro area 
countries, and between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’.1 The new level of supervision 
that was created should replace current structures and not superimpose 
another structure. This supervisory ‘mechanism’, composed of the ECB and 
national supervisors, should operate in an integrated and efficient way, 
avoiding duplication of effort, not creating an additional layer. In examining 
the structure that has been put in place, we find that a big step forward has 
been made, but important issues remain to be addressed and inconsistencies 
need to be ironed out. 
2. The regulatory framework 
 The most important issues for Banking Union to work are 
implementation and enforcement. The SSM and related regulations are 
straightforward, but they mostly cover the significant banks. A large 
part of the banking system, measured as the number of banks (as 
separate legal entities) but not in total assets, remains under the direct 
supervision of the national competent authorities (NCAs). It will be of 
utmost importance to maintain a level playing field between the two 
tiers of banks in the SSM, and also between the SSM and the rest of the 
EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). 
 The euro area should be the home (and host) country for banks. 
Notification requirements to NCAs for cross-border branching and 
                                                   
1 The ‘ins’ are the euro-area countries and the non-euro-area EU countries that opt 
to join the SSM. The ‘outs’ are the other EEA countries that are not under the SSM. 
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provision of services should be eliminated within the SSM, and 
national diversity in capital add-ons and buffers should be avoided to 
enhance market integration. 
 The single rulebook allows for the proliferation of rulemaking. The EU 
needs a process to constrain excessive references to delegated and 
implementing acts in primary law. In the context of the vital 
importance of banks for the financing of the economy and the 
prominence of better regulation for the new Juncker Commission, a 
review of the scope and practice of European financial rulemaking 
should be considered. The single rulebook rules should be sufficiently 
calibrated to take into account the diversity of banking systems and the 
differences in systemic relevance of the banks under supervision. 
Meanwhile, the ECB should take the opportunity to harmonise the 
exercise of options and discretions that are available to the competent 
authorities under the single rulebook, with the aim of creating a truly 
level-playing field. 
3. Supervision 
 Supervisory practices will converge through the development of an 
SSM approach to banking supervision. The SSM Supervisory Manual 
will apply both to significant banks and to less significant banks. To 
counter a possible slowdown in supervisory convergence in the single 
market between the significant banks, the less significant banks in the 
SSM and the banks in the outs, the ECB and the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) should develop a supervisory convergence scorecard. 
This should list measures undertaken to enhance convergence and its 
achievements.  
 The ECB’s scope of supervision will need to be under constant 
monitoring, as the distinction between significant and less significant 
is not clear-cut, certainly for banks belonging to a network. Good 
supervisory practice developed by the Joint Supervisory Teams will 
need to be passed on to national competent authorities and to the 
supervision of the less significant banks. 
 A common supervisory culture will take years to emerge. The use of a 
common language within the SSM is a step forward, but faces practical 
problems, since a huge amount of information is available only in 
national languages. A pragmatic approach will thus be necessary in 
order to ensure a smooth transition towards a new regime. 
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 The duplication in supervisory tasks between the EBA and the ECB 
needs to be tackled in the context of the review by the European 
Supervisory Authority (ESA). Although EBA’s supervisory tasks 
remain important for the non-SSM countries, as ‘trait d’union’ between 
the SSM and the broader EU, some overlaps will irritate markets and 
create confusion. Duplication in the stress tests, participation in 
colleges of supervisors and data collection or peer review of 
supervisors need to be coordinated and integrated as much as possible. 
 The language for reporting is the accounting standards, but they are 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) only for listed 
banks in the EU/EEA, and on a consolidated basis. This implies that 
no harmonised accounting standards apply for more than half of the 
banks supervised by the ECB, which requires urgent action by policy-
makers.  
 Much work remains to be done to improve the supervisory 
transparency in the EU. Different member states use different 
practices, which will be a challenging task to align, but a necessary one 
in order to enhance comparability and market discipline.  
4. Resolution and deposit insurance 
 For the first time, a legal framework is in place for the recovery and 
resolution of banks, at EU level, and also for most member states. If 
well implemented, the many layers of defence should ensure prompt 
corrective action by supervisors and resolution authorities, and protect 
the taxpayer from having to bail out banks in the future. But markets 
need to be convinced that the new framework is credible to eliminate 
differences in country-based funding costs. 
 More work needs to be done at global level to clarify the effective 
application of the bail-in framework for large cross-border banks. 
Europe is host to one-half of the globally systemically important banks, 
and thus has to lead the debate. 
 A useful step forward was achieved with the 2014 re-cast of the deposit 
guarantee schemes Directive. Although it maintains the diversity of 
the systems, it introduces a minimum pre-funding rate and a 
maximum pay-out. But with the decentralised structure, and the 
complicated decision-making structure in the Single Resolution Board, 
the risk remains that reactions to banking crisis may unfold differently 
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in the various member states, for instance due to the possibility to use 
the deposit guarantee schemes for resolution at national level. 
5. Institutional structure 
 The SSM should not be an additional supervisor, but a single 
supervisor: the current structure preserves both – the NCAs and the 
ECB. This leaves scope for further streamlining the structure, which 
should be undertaken in the context of the ongoing European 
Supervisory Authority (ESA) Review, or in the forthcoming SSM 
Review. 
 In the context of the ESA review, the SSM representative should have 
a vote on the EBA board. 
 With respect to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the SSM, 
macro-prudential supervision should be coordinated as much as 
possible across member states. While the supervisory and central bank 
community accept that macro-prudential policy belongs to the central 
bank remit in the longer run, the emergence of a macro-prudential 
supervisor, acting independently from central banks and supervisors, 
is seen in some academic circles as having merit and a possibility to 
explore in the future. 
 The start of the SSM is a step towards a twin-peaks or objective-based 
model of financial supervision in the EU, with prudential supervision 
centralised for the systemically important banks in the eurozone, and 
conduct-of-business supervision decentralised at state level. The logic 
of this new structure has to be followed to its full conclusion and will 
require further institutional and EU treaty changes in the future, with 
possibly a separate structure for the supervision of large financial 
institutions in the EU in the long run. But conduct of business 
supervision will also need to be strengthened at EU level, through 
adjusting the mandates of and the cooperation between the ESAs.   
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1. THE EUROPEAN BANKING LANDSCAPE 
IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SSM 
he Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is starting in the wake of a 
long and costly financial and economic crisis that profoundly affected 
the structure, soundness and performance of EU-based banks. To 
measure the breadth of the task of the new supervisory authority, but also to 
highlight the continuing diversity in EU banking, this introductory chapter 
describes the structure of the national banking sectors, explains the large 
differences in the number of banks in the various member states of the EU 
and compares the soundness and the performance of the banking sector in 
the EU in terms of the type of bank, ownership and country.  
1.1 Explaining the diversity in the banking population in the EU 
Banks are the primary financial intermediaries in the EU, which is reflected 
in the presence of large banking sectors in most countries. The total assets of 
the banking sectors in the EU are on average around three times the GDP in 
2013, but they vary widely between countries from 57% in Romania to 
1,579% in Luxembourg (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Relative size of the EU banking sectors, 2008-13 
 
Note: The relative size of the banking sector is measured by total banking assets as a share of 
domestic GDP.  
* No figures available for 2008. 
Source: ECB (2014). 
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Overall, the relatively largest banking sectors can be found in the old 
member states and the financial centres of Malta and Cyprus. In absolute size 
of total assets, the UK dominates, followed by Germany and France. The 
relative size of most banking sectors has on average been stable since the 
start the financial crisis, but declined significantly in a few states – with 
Ireland, Belgium and Germany being the most significant. In the euro area, 
the only countries whose banking sector grew were Finland and Spain.  
The number of credit institutions and branches are unequally divided 
across the individual member states. According to our calculations, the euro 
area accounted for approximately 6,110 separate legal entities of credit 
institutions’ entities and branches in 2012.2 This figure represents about 75% 
of the total number for the EU-27, with 7,965 entities, or 8,200 for the 
European Economic Area (EEA) as a whole.3 Looking at the breakdown 
between countries, the three largest EU economies account for around one-
third of the total number of banks. Germany accounts for most credit 
institutions and branches. France and the United Kingdom have fewer 
institutions as compared for instance to Austria, Italy and Poland, but they 
are still among the 10 countries with the most banking institutions. In turn, 
the three largest economies of the EU dominate the banking sector in terms 
of total assets. The banking sectors in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom cover more than one-half of the total banking assets in the EU.  
Most of the countries that are overrepresented in terms of the number 
of credit institutions (CIs) and branches as a share of assets also have large 
domestic networks of credit institutions. These networks, which include the 
major part of the savings and cooperative banks, are subject to joint liability 
schemes and/or are strongly interconnected via shared operations. They 
often group certain governance and risk-control functions, but maintain 
decentralised or bottom-up decision-making structures. In turn, the 
supervision is or could be delegated to the central institution to streamline 
the governance processes. Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Portugal have large networks, 
which is reflected in the relatively high shares in number of credit 
                                                   
2 For this assessment, the country agglomerations as of December 2012 have been 
used. Hence, Latvia, which adopted the euro in January 2014, is included as a non-
euro area EU country and Croatia, which joined the EU in July 2013, was excluded 
from the analysis altogether (see Annex 1). 
3 For an extensive review of the composition of the sample and the classification, see 
Annex 1.  
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institutions compared to the size of their banking sector in terms of total 
assets (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Total credit institutions and total assets in the EEA 
 
 
Note: The figure is based on 2012 data. 
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland, EBA, ECB, Liechtenstein Amt für Statistik and Statistics 
Norway (2013). 
The 60 networks identified in the EU and EEA encompass 4,710 
different local banks and central institutions, accounting for 57% of the total 
number of credit institutions and branches (see Figure 3).4 About half of the 
networks are located in Austria and Germany where some cooperative and 
savings banks are organised in regional joint liability schemes and central 
institutions. In addition to the local banks and central institutions, the 
                                                   
4 In total, 5,110 credit institutions and branches belong to 60 different domestic 
networks. Over 1,500 Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken and Sparkasse in Germany are 
part of 22 of these networks and the 500 Raiffeisenbanken in Austria are part of 
another 10 networks. These networks, which include several central institutions that 
support the local banks, operate under partial liability at a regional level. Another 
30 networks are less integrated and therefore not included in the domestic networks. 
The latter include the Danish Sparrekasse (38 local banks), English building societies 
(47), Banche Popolari (29) and Cassa di Risparmio (12) in Italy, Lithuanian credit 
unions (14), Norwegian Sparebanken (16) as well as the Spanish Cajas (12). 
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networks have 301 subsidiaries that possess a credit institution license and 
99 branches.  
Figure 3. European banking sector structure framework 
  
Note:  The numbers in the figures are the number of unconsolidated credit institutions and/or 
branches in the EEA as of 2012. 
The subgroup of standalone credit institutions, parent institutions of 
banking groups and banking subsidiaries of non-financial companies in the 
EEA are referred to as “parent institutions” without the addition of branches. 
This category of credit institutions includes around 975 institutions or 12% 
of the total number of credit institutions and branches. About four-fifths of 
these parent institutions do not have a majority owner or are owned by one 
of the public institutions in the EEA. The remaining one-fifth of the parent 
institutions are owned by 136 non-credit institutions in the EEA (e.g. 
insurers, car manufacturers, etc.).  
Subsidiaries of parent institutions represent about 801 institutions or 
10% of the total credit institutions and branches in the EEA. The largest share 
of these subsidiaries, around 453 entities, belong to domestic parent 
institutions. The domestic subsidiaries are concentrated in France, Italy and 
Spain where the domestic parent institutions have about 279 subsidiaries. 
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The host country supervisors are responsible for the supervision of 
subsidiaries and coordinate the supervision of the banking group with other 
supervisors in colleges. When the supervisor of the subsidiary is also the 
home-country supervisor of the parent institution, the supervision of both 
can be combined.   
Unlike subsidiaries, branches are supervised by the home-country 
prudential supervisor. In fact, the overall number of supervised banking 
groups in the EEA would have been 38% higher if these branches have been 
subject to supervision by the supervisor in the host country, as is the case 
with subsidiaries. There are in total 913 branches not included in a network 
representing 11% of the EEA total credit institutions and branches. Since 
branches are exclusively used to conduct activities abroad, there are barely 
any branches established in the country of the ultimate owner. In fact, the 12 
‘domestic’ branches identified are branches of foreign subsidiaries of the 
ultimate owner. The majority of the branches, around 540, belong to an 
ultimate owner in other EU member states. Another 340 branches belong to 
136 non-EEA ultimate owners.5 
Figure 4. Concentration ratios and number of supervised institutions 
 
Note: The figure is based on concentration ratios in 2013 and the number of supervised 
institutions in 2012. 
Source: ECB (2014) and Ayadi & de Groen (2014a). 
                                                   
5 In total, some 250 or 20% of the EEA banking groups are owned by non-EEA parent 
institutions. Most of the ultimate owners are domiciled in Asia (103 in total), North 
America (64, of which 47 are in the United States) or European countries outside the 
EEA (52, of which 26 are in Switzerland). 
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When the credit institutions and branches are consolidated on the basis 
of networks and majority ownership, the 8,200 EEA credit institutions and 
branches in fact form 1,274 banking groups. This is also, according to our 
findings, the number of supervised institutions when the supervision would 
be fully consolidated at the EEA level as well as delegated to central 
institutions for all dense domestic networks of credit institutions, which in 
some countries are still supervised on an individual basis. Figure 4 shows 
the number of supervised institutions by country compared to the 
concentration in assets. 
The credit institutions and branches are far from equally divided 
across these banking groups. Figure 5 and 6 present the distribution of credit 
institutions and branches across banking groups.  
Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of 
credit institutions and branches 
across banking groups* 
Figure 6. Distribution of credit 
institutions and branches across banking 
groups* 
* 2012 data on number of credit 
institutions and branches. 
* 2012 data on number of credit institutions and 
branches as well as ownership data. 
It shows that the top 1% of banking groups (representing 13 banking 
groups) controls about 36% of the number of credit institutions and branches 
in the EEA. This category contains almost exclusively networks. The French 
BNP Paribas is the only non-network that accounts for more than 100 
branches and subsidiaries in the EEA. The other 4% (51 groups) control 33% 
of the local banks, central institutions, parent institutions, subsidiaries and 
branches. And the remaining 95% of the banking groups control only 31% of 
the institutions and branches. Hence, most (848 or 67%) of the banking 
groups are standalone credit institutions or sole banking subsidiaries of 
either non-financial companies in the EEA or owner domiciled outside the 
EEA. 
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Looking at the cross-border strategy in more detail, less than one-
quarter of the EEA banking groups are currently undertaking banking 
activities in multiple EEA countries. Table 1 shows the internationalisation 
of the EEA banks by focusing on the number of unique countries where a 
bank is active. Hence, when a banking group has multiple subsidiaries in a 
single country, this counts as one unique country; when a banking group has 
both a subsidiary and a branch in a country, the ‘larger’ subsidiary is 
counted; and when a banking group has only a credit institution licence or 
branches in a single country, it appears in the table as zero foreign 
subsidiaries and branches. The banking groups can undertake international 
licensed banking activities via a network of branches, subsidiaries or a 
combination of both. The 300 international banking groups that are active in 
multiple countries have around 650 branches and 450 subsidiaries. Most of 
these banking groups conduct their foreign activities exclusively through 
branches, while 110 banking groups use a combination of subsidiaries and 
branches, and only 60 banking groups exclusively use subsidiaries for their 
international activities.  
Table 1. Internationalisation of banking groups, 2012 
 Foreign branches  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 5+ Total 
Fo
re
ig
n 
su
bs
id
ia
ri
es
 0 968 79 22 16 8 4 4 1,101 
1 40 16 12 3 2 2 3 78 
2 13 8 4 1 3 1 4 34 
3 5 3 1 3 3 2 2 19 
4 1 4 3 0 0 3 5 16 
5 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 5 
5+ 3 0 5 1 2 3 7 21 
 Total 1,030 111 47 25 18 18 25 1,274 
Note: The number of subsidiaries and EEA branches in the table expresses the number of 
unique countries in which the banking group is active outside its EEA home market. When a 
banking group has both a branch and a subsidiary in a single country, it is presented as a 
subsidiary in the table, since it is the strongest form of internationalisation.  
The findings further suggest that only a few international banking 
groups have activities in large parts of the EEA. The majority of the cross-
border banking groups have only branches or subsidiaries in one or two 
countries. There is a small group of 27 banking groups with banking 
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activities in more than 10 countries. Of these banking groups, the US-
domiciled Citigroup is active in most countries, with subsidiaries and 
branches in 22 out of the 30 EEA countries.  
The large number of credit institutions and branches is a first step to 
analyse the sector, although it is not sufficient to fully understand the 
underlying structure. The banking sector in the EEA is much more 
consolidated than the statistics on the number of credit institutions and 
branches would suggest at first sight. In addition, there is a high degree of 
diversity of the different banking groups. The latter are either organised via 
parent entities with ownership links and shared licences or via networks 
with an explicit interconnection, such as joint liability schemes (e.g. in the 
case of cooperatives groups). The diversity in ownership requires special 
supervisory attention now that the ECB is taking over bank supervisory 
functions.6 But it also indicates that the ECB’s subdivision between 
significant and less-significant institutions is arbitrary, as the ECB considers 
some networks as single institutions, but treats other credit institutions that 
belong to large integrated networks as separate institutions.  
1.2 The international supervisory framework 
In recent years three new authorities, namely the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the ECB and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), have 
stepped-in to monitor and supervise the activities of cross-border banking 
groups in the EU and internationally. The 30 banking groups identified by 
the FSB as globally significant are required to hold more capital and to take 
more stringent precautionary measures to allow resolution. Some 124 banks 
in the EEA have been subject to the EU-wide stress test conducted by the 
EBA in 2014. From November 2014 onwards, the ECB is supervising the 
largest banks of all the member states of the euro area, including the largest 
euro-area banking groups as well as subsidiaries of large banks domiciled in 
other EU member states or third countries.7  
                                                   
6 In fact, previous research on savings and cooperative banks confirms that 
institutional diversity contributes to systemic stability and the financing of the real 
economy (see Ayadi et al., 2009 and 2010). 
7 The final list of banks supervised by the ECB, published on 4 September 2014 by 
the ECB, contains 120 banks. However, among these banks are also five majority-
owned subsidiaries of banking groups that are also subject to direct supervision on 
a stand-alone basis. These subsidiaries have not been analysed separately, but are 
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Table 2 provides an overview of the parent institutions, branches and 
banking groups by international supervisor. The ECB will in the first 
instance become the direct supervisor of 120 banks belonging to 115 euro-
area banking groups when subsidiaries of non-euro area banking groups are 
treated separately and 110 distinct banking groups when multiple 
subsidiaries of a single banking group outside the euro area are treated as 
single banking groups as well.8  
In order to prevent double counting and including assets that will not 
be supervised by the ECB in this analysis, the five subsidiaries of euro-area 
banking groups are assessed as an integral part of the consolidated group. 
The supervised banks consist of 36% unconsolidated credit institutions and 
branches in the euro area plus the 119 branches in non-euro area countries. 
If all 170 cross-border banking groups in the EEA had been supervised by a 
single supervisor, the number of supervised institutions would decrease by 
approximately 25% from 1,725 to 1,274. Looking only at the euro area, if the 
supervision of cross-border banking groups would be organised at the euro-
area level, this would lower the number of supervised banks to 870, from 
950. To accomplish this, the supervision of the remaining 80 out of 130 cross-
border banking groups using subsidiaries for their internationalisation 
inside the euro area should be centralised, either at the home country 
supervisor of the parent institution or a cross-border supervisor like the ECB. 
For macro-prudential supervision purposes, however, the banks might still 
report per country or relevant market areas. 
 
                                                   
an integral part of banking groups. See Annex 4 for an overview of all the banks that 
are subject to direct supervision by the ECB from November 2014 onwards.  
8 A bank’s total assets are the main criterion to come under direct ECB supervision. 
Banking groups will be directly supervised by the ECB if their total assets exceed 
€30 billion, or total assets exceed €5 billion and represent at least 20% of domestic 
GDP or are among the three largest credit institutions in a member state. The ECB 
will further supervise banks that receive direct support by the EFSF and ESM 
directly, and has some discretionary power to identify additional banks of 
significant relevance for direct supervision (Article 6, OJ L 287 of 29.10.2013). 
However, the initial list of banks supervised by the ECB disclosed in October 2013 
by the ECB only contained banks selected on the basis of their total assets. 
14 | THE EUROPEAN BANKING LANDSCAPE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SSM 
Table 2. EEA credit institutions and banking groups by supervisor 
 
Net- 
works 
Parent 
institu- 
tions 
Subsi-
diaries 
(non-EEA/ 
non-CIs) 
Subsi-
diaries 
(CIs) 
Bran- 
ches Total 
% of 
EEA 
total 
% of 
euro 
area 
total 
FSB (All)         
CIs 178 12 78 338 352 958 11.7 12.4 
Banking 
groups 2 12 16 0 0 30 2.4 3.2 
FSB (EEA)         
CIs 178 12 0 333 231 754 9.2 10.0 
Banking 
groups 2 12 0 0 0 14 1.1 1.6 
EBA         
CIs 1,381 89 16 707 491 2,684 32.7 37.4 
Banking 
groups 19 88 13 2 0 122 9.6 13.3 
ECB         
CIs (EEA) 1,317 70 18 626 371 2,402 29.3 .. 
CIs (EA) 1,317 69 18 526 252 2,182 26.6 35.7 
Banking 
groups 20 70 12 12 0 114 8.9 13.2 
Notes: FSB (All): Includes all global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) that were on the 
November 2014 list of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and active in the EEA; FSB (EEA): 
Includes all G-SIBS as of November 2014 with their headquarters active in the EEA; EBA: 
includes all the banking groups that are subject to the 2014 EU-wide stress test; and ECB: 
Includes all the banks that will be directly supervised by the ECB from November 2014 
onwards. La Société de financement local (SFIL) has been excluded from the analysis, since it 
was founded after the cut-off date of 31 December 2012 for the credit institutions and 
branches. For the banks supervised by the ECB, a distinction was made between the parent 
institutions, subsidiaries and branches located in the euro-area (EA) and all institutions in the 
EEA.9  
Turning to the other micro-prudential supervisors, the work of FSB 
and EBA is complementary to the tasks of the national supervisors and the 
ECB. The 30 banking groups designated as Global Systemically Important 
Banks (G-SIBs) by the FSB are active in the EU and the EEA, of which 14 have 
                                                   
9 The number of credit institutions and branches belonging to the banks supervised 
by the ECB is higher than indicated by the ECB. This is primarily because the ECB is 
not including all the member banks belonging to cooperative networks in Austria 
and Italy and excludes branches as well. 
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their headquarters in the EEA. Whilst the G-SIBs represent only 2% of the 
banking groups in number of entities, they control 958 or 12% of the credit 
institutions and branches in the EEA. Most of these belong to the FSB banks 
with their headquarters in the EEA, which control 754 or 9% of the credit 
institutions and branches in the EEA. The 123 banking groups stress-tested 
by the EBA control more than four times as many credit institutions (around 
2,402) or 36% of the credit institutions and branches.  
There is a substantial overlap between the groups of banks monitored 
by the cross-border supervisors. Figure 7 shows the new supervisory 
landscape amidst the implementation of the SSM. Three-quarters of the 
banking groups that were subject to an EBA stress test in the past few years 
will be supervised by the ECB in the near future. Nine of these banking 
groups headquartered in the euro area are identified as G-SIBs by the FSB 
and need therefore to hold higher capital buffers and will also be subject to 
monitoring by the FSB. Moreover, four of the five remaining EEA-based G-
SIBs have been subject to the EBA stress tests. Another 12 of the ECB-
supervised banking groups are subsidiaries of EBA stress-tested banks, 
Standard Chartered bank being the only exception.10 
The consolidation of cross-border supervision at the ECB for the 120 
largest banks in the euro area, belonging to 110 distinct banking groups, is a 
first step in this direction, which is likely to contribute to a more effective 
and efficient supervision. Hence, it is likely to reduce forbearance and 
circumvents the organisational problems of supervisory colleges, such as 
fragmented and insufficient information sharing. For banking groups it 
should further reduce the administrative burden if they just have to comply 
with the supervisory standards of a single prudential supervisor. Still, 
effective concentrated supervision can be hampered by discrepancies in 
national regulations as well as the possibility that it might have some 
undesirable side effects such as the promotion of ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks in the 
euro area.11 Now that the ECB is taking over, there will still be room for 
                                                   
10 Standard Chartered Bank conducts most of its activities outside the EEA, while all 
the other G-SIFIs with HQs in the EEA have significant activities within the EEA. 
11 See also ESRB (2014), which discusses overbanking. Based on previous scientific 
research as well as CEPS analysis the largest 20 banks in the EU are responsible for 
the growth of the banking sector in terms of GDP over the past two decades. 
Notwithstanding the growth of the non-traditional relationship lending of these 
large banks, they argue that growth of the banking sector at large only contributes 
to economic growth up to a certain threshold-level of credit as a share of GDP, which 
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further consolidation of prudential supervision of cross-border euro-area 
banks. There are still 66 cross-border banking groups in the euro-area that 
the ECB will not supervise directly and of 11 banking groups with their 
parent institution outside the euro-area, it is only supervising part of the 
euro-area subsidiaries. 
Figure 7. Banking groups active in the EEA by supervisor and area 
 
Notes: The numbers beside NSAs indicate the cumulative number of banking groups 
supervised by National Supervisory Authorities at the end of 2012. The amounts in the left-
hand corner express the consolidated number of banking groups in the total area. The 
remaining figures express the number of supervised institutions. Only exact overlaps are 
considered. Hence, the subsidiaries of EBA-supervised banking groups are not considered as 
overlap. The list of ECB-supervised banks includes 12 subsidiaries of EBA stress-tested banks 
(namely Barclays, SEB AB (3x), Swedbank (2x), Danske, Nordea, HSBC (2x), RBS (2x)). La 
Société de financement local (SFIL) has been excluded from the analysis since it was founded 
after the cut-off date in January 2013. See also Annex 5 for the number of supervised banking 
groups by country. 
                                                   
most developed countries have already reached (Pagano & Pica, 2012). Once the 
tipping point is exceeded, economic growth might even diminish (Arcand, Berkes & 
Panizza, 2012).  
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1.3 A closer look to the banks supervised by the ECB12 
The banks directly supervised by the ECB account for more than 80% or €23.5 
trillion of the banking assets in the euro area. At member state level, the 
banking groups can account for up to 60% of the domestic banking assets, 
while at euro-area level there is no single bank that has more than 7% of the 
banking assets. The Finnish subsidiary of Nordea Group, Nordea Bank 
Finland, had total assets equal to approximately 58% of the total banking 
assets in Finland (2013 data). In turn, the largest bank in the euro area, BNP 
Paribas, had €1,800 billion total assets, which is equal to 6.7% of the euro-
area banking assets (see also Annex 6).  
Figure 8. Cumulative share in assets by number of banks in the SSM 
 
Note: The figures present the cumulative share in assets of 115 banks supervised by the ECB.  
Source: CEPS configuration based on financial statements from banks under the SSM. 
The ten largest banks are responsible for 52% of the total assets in the 
SSM (see Figure 9). These banks are headquartered in one of the five largest 
euro-area banking sectors: France is home-country to five of the top 10 banks, 
the Netherlands to two, and Germany, Spain, and Italy are each home to one 
bank. See Figure 8 for the distribution of the assets of the 10 largest banks 
supervised by the ECB across home countries. In fact, the 16 largest banks 
have their headquarters in the five eurozone countries with the largest 
banking sectors. The largest bank that has its headquarters in a different 
                                                   
12 This section draws on data collected by CEPS from the financial statements of the 
SSM banks. 
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country is the Finnish subsidiary of Nordea Group with €305 billion 
domestic assets in 2013. 
Figure 9. Distribution of assets of the 10 largest Banks supervised by the ECB 
across countries, 2013 
 
Source: CEPS. 
Figure 10. Growth assets (% of total assets), 2007-13 
 
Note: The figures above present the median annual asset growth of banks supervised by the 
ECB. The asset growth is the relative increase in total assets. 
Source: CEPS configuration based on financial statements from banks under the SSM. 
Looking at the ownership of the banks supervised by the ECB, around 
55% of the banks are owned by a shareholder or group of shareholders that 
holds more than half of the shares. This group includes banks that are owned 
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by governments or related institutions, non-banking companies, non-euro 
area banking groups, local or regional cooperative banks as well as 
foundations. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the banks across the 
different types of ownership. Most of the banks are profit-maximising or so-
called shareholder-value oriented banks (SHV). This group accounts for 
about three-fifths of the banks supervised by the ECB, including the 
subcategories commercial banks, subsidiaries of both EEA and non-EEA 
banks as well as the banks that were nationalised during the global financial 
and euro-area economic crisis that are foreseen to be privatised in the near 
future. Yet, for the supervision of the subsidiaries that represent about 16% 
of the banks supervised by the ECB that the ECB will not be the main 
supervisor, it will have to cooperate with other supervisors. The other 41% 
of the banks, the so-called stakeholder-value banks (STV), have other 
objectives than profit-maximisation and a different governance structure. 
This category includes cooperative banking groups, whose primary 
objective is to provide financial services to their members. The cooperative 
and savings banks each represent almost one-fifth of the banks supervised 
by the ECB, with the public utility and development banks accounting for 
the remaining 5%. 
Figure 11. Banks supervised by the ECB by type of ownership 
 
Source: CEPS configuration based on financial statements from banks under the SSM. 
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Government ownership increased considerably since the start of the 
financial crisis, and the state is an important owner of banks supervised by 
the ECB. Many of the European banks received state aid in the form of 
guarantees, liquidity or capital support. In total around one-third of the 
banks supervised by the ECB received state aid, and by the end of 2013 euro-
area governments still had shareholdings in 20 of these banks.13 In addition, 
the governments also have historical holdings in some commercial and 
special purpose banks (e.g. funding infrastructure projects and local 
governments), which is reflected in government holdings of more than 5% 
of the shares in about 30% of the banks supervised by the ECB. Euro-area 
governments thus hold directly or indirectly a significant share on one-
quarter of the banks supervised by the ECB, of which about one-half were 
acquired through nationalisation during the 2007-09 financial and the 2010-
12 sovereign debt crises. Alongside the owners, national governments are 
also responsible for the regulation and the supervision of these banks, but 
they are potentially subject to more flexible rules and supervision, which 
distort competition as well as contribute to banking-sector fragility, although 
research on the subject is inconclusive (see e.g. Barth et al., 2004 and Caprio 
& Martinez, 2000). 
Accommodating the diversity in the banking sector will be a 
challenging exercise under the SSM. Institutional diversity matters and 
should be preserved as it contributes to systemic stability and it is essential 
for funding the real economy (Ayadi et al., 2009 and 2010). As a 
supranational regulator and supervisor, the ECB may be tempted to apply 
the same rules and supervisory approach to all institutions irrespective to 
their intrinsic differences in terms of governance, incentive systems and 
organisational structure. Such an approach will have consequences and 
might reduce the overall level of diversity in the system.  
1.4 A micro-assessment of the EU banking sector’s soundness 
Turning to the balance sheet and performance analysis, the financial 
statements indicate that banks supervised by the ECB were severely hit by 
the crisis. Although the median returns are still positive, profits dropped 
significantly with approximately two-fifths of the banks reporting negative 
cumulative profits between 2008 and 2013. Figure 12 shows that the median 
return on assets has decreased from almost 0.9% before the crisis to 0.3% 
during the financial crisis and to less than 0.2% in the midst of the sovereign 
                                                   
13 See Ayadi & de Groen (2014b). 
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debt crisis. Return on equity, shown in Figure 13, follows the same trend. 
The return on equity dropped from median levels between 16% and 18% pre-
crisis to 4% and 7% during the financial and economic crises. The low 
profitability restrains banks to find other ways to bolster their capital 
position with retained earnings.  
 
Figure 12. Return on assets, 2006-13 
 
Note: The axis presents the median return 
on assets ratios of 112 out of 115 banks 
supervised by the ECB. The ROA is the 
profit before tax divided by the total assets.   
Figure 13. Return on equity, 2006-13 
 
Note: The axis presents the median return 
on equity ratios of 112 out of 115 banks 
supervised by the ECB. The ROE is the 
profit before tax divided by the total equity. 
The low levels of capital placed the sector in a vulnerable position 
when the financial crisis hit in 2008. Figure 16 shows that the median equity 
ratio of banks supervised by the ECB fluctuated between 4.8% and 6.0% in 
the period 2008 to 2013. Banks initially strengthened their capital base after 
the burst of the financial crisis, but the gains were wiped out during the 
economic crisis. The improvement of the capital base during the financial 
crisis was primarily due to an outright increase in capital (i.e. capital issuance 
and government recapitalisations), while the increase in 2013 was primarily 
due to a decrease in total assets, as shown in Figure 10. The low profitability 
and limited access to capital markets forced banks to reduce the capital 
requirement to bolster their regulatory capital positions.  
The capital levels (based on balance sheet data) only started to increase 
since 2012, while the regulatory capital ratios have increased steadily since 
2007. Figure 14 shows that the median tier 1 capital ratio has gradually 
increased from 8.0% in 2007 to 12.9% in 2013. This was partially due to the 
tax credits resulting from the write-downs of intangible assets, but also due 
to deleveraging (see Figure 10) and a decrease in average risk weights (see 
Figure 15). Hence, the median risk-weighted assets as a share of total assets 
declined from 55% to 43% between 2007 and 2013. The banks reduced their 
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
22 | THE EUROPEAN BANKING LANDSCAPE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SSM 
risk weights by changing the asset mix to assets with lower risk weights, for 
example the exposure to zero-risk weighted governments increased 
significantly. Or they changed the calibration of risk weights, for example by 
application or changing of the existing internal models. The flexibility in risk-
weights may result in misalignment between the risk-weights and 
underlying risk, as demonstrated in Ayadi & de Groen (2014a), which show 
that the risk weight of banks with certain business models (i.e. wholesale and 
investment banks) did not coincide with their distance to default in recent 
years. In order to make the calibration of the risk-weights more reliable and 
halt the race to the bottom, the internal governance needs to be improved 
and an additional effort from the supervisors is required.  
 
Figure 14. Tier 1 capital ratio, 
2006-13 (% of RWA)  
 
Note: The axis presents the median tier 1 
capital ratios of 102 banks supervised by the 
ECB. The tier 1 capital ratio is the share of 
tier 1 capital in total risk-weighted assets.   
Figure 15. Risk-weighted assets, 
2006-13 (% of assets) 
 
Note: The axis presents the median risk-
weighted assets of 102 banks supervised by 
the ECB. The share of risk-weighted assets 
ratio is presented as a share of total assets.
Turning to the funding position, the banks have gradually increased 
their dependence on customer deposits. There are both demand and supply 
factors likely to have led to an increase in the share of customer deposits in 
total liabilities and equity from 38% for the median SSM bank in 2008 to 51% 
in 2013, as shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 16. Equity ratio, 2006-13 
(% of assets) 
 
Note: The figures above present the median 
equity ratios of 112 out of 115 banks 
supervised by the ECB. The equity ratio is 
the share of total equity in total assets.  
Source: CEPS Banking Database. 
Figure 17. Customer deposits, 2006-13 
(% of assets) 
 
Note: The figures above present the median 
annual customer deposits as share of total 
assets of 112 out of 115 banks supervised by 
the ECB. 
Source: CEPS Banking Database. 
The crises made it harder for banks to obtain funds from other sources 
such as the interbank or capital markets, which made customer deposits a 
more attractive source of funding. Moreover, the new capital requirement 
legislation favours the usage of customer deposits for funding. On the other 
hand, the crises have made the depositors who benefit from deposit 
guarantee schemes more risk-averse. 
1.5 Summing-up 
Although the EEA accounts for 7,200 credit institutions and 1,000 branches, 
it is much more consolidated than these figures would suggest. But this is 
not yet fully anticipated in the supervisory framework that largely follows 
national lines. The cross-border supervision by the ECB of the 120 largest 
and other systemic banks in countries that make up the euro area is a first 
step to allow such consolidation, which is likely to contribute to a more 
effective and efficient control. Hence, it is likely to reduce forbearance and 
overcomes at least part of the organisational problems of supervisory 
colleges, such as insufficient information sharing, fragmented overviews and 
national championing. For banking groups, it should further reduce the 
administrative burden as they will have to comply with the supervisory 
standards of a lower number of prudential supervisors. However, the 
diversity in the objectives of different types of banks (e.g. cooperative, 
savings and public banks) and the varying degrees of independence 
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exercised within the banking groups (i.e. parent institution and subsidiaries) 
call for close monitoring.  
One of the key tasks of the ECB will be to ensure that overall soundness 
of the sector is carefully monitored. The ECB’s Asset Quality Review and 
Stress Test, of which the results were presented in October 2014, form an 
important first contribution towards enhancing the confidence in the 
eurozone’s banking sector. The focus on the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio, 
however, also make it more sensitive to the flexibility in risk weights (Achary 
et al., 2014 and de Groen, 2014). The monitoring of the risk-weights and their 
comparability across banks will need to be improved to further improve the 
value of these exercises.  
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2. BANKING UNION PILLAR I: THE 
SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM 
he Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) forms one of the three key 
pillars of the Banking Union. The Regulation was adopted in October 
2013 and formed the basis for the SSM to start in November 2014. This 
chapter describes the key aspects of the SSM: its composition and the 
operational structure, the supervisory reporting and the division of labour 
between the ECB and the national authorities, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).  
2.1 The basis: The SSM Regulation 
The SSM Regulation is a relatively straightforward piece of EU legislation 
implementing Art. 127(6) of the EU Treaty. It supersedes the home/host-
country distinction and entrusts authorisation and supervision of the 
systemic and largest credit institutions of each of the eurozone countries and 
of the countries that choose to opt-into the SSM,14 to the ECB. It defines 
supervision, mandates cooperation between the ECB and the national 
competent authorities, the other European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and the ESRB. It allows the ECB to enact regulations and guidelines to carry 
out the tasks set out in the SSM Regulation. For those credit institutions in 
the eurozone where the ECB is not in charge of direct supervision, the 
regulation maintains the home/host-country system (Art. 17) but mandates 
close cooperation with and reporting to the ECB. It also allows the ECB to 
take over supervision of those institutions at any time (Art. 6.5b). 
The SSM only covers prudential supervision. The regulation states 
clearly that those “supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB should remain 
with the national authorities” (Recital 28). Nor are accounting standards 
harmonised by the Regulation (Recital 19). In addition, capital buffers and 
macro-prudential measures remain the primary responsibility of the 
                                                   
14 So-called ‘opt-ins’. The ‘opt-outs’ are those countries, e.g. Sweden and the UK, that 
have formally declared their intention not to participate in the SSM. 
T
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member states, as further to the CRDIV, implementing Basel III, although 
the ECB is allowed to apply higher buffers (Art. 5.1-2).  
Soon after publication of the SSM Regulation, the ECB published a list 
of the 130 institutions falling under its direct supervision, and announced a 
comprehensive assessment of these institutions, as foreseen in Art. 33.4, 
“prior to assuming its new supervisory tasks in November 2014” (see Figure 
18). This list included all banks that the ECB believed could be regarded as 
significant at that time, when the methodology to determine significance had 
not been finalised. This comprised an asset quality review (AQR) and a stress 
test. The intention of the exercise was to increase transparency, to build 
confidence and to repair the banking system where necessary, requiring 
corrective measures from the banks. The Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital was used as a benchmark, the threshold level was 8% for the AQR 
and baseline scenario of the stress test and 5.5% for the adverse scenario. In 
total, 25 banks failed at least one part of the test, falling in total €24.6 billion 
short. Due to capital measures taken earlier in 2014 and restructuring 
arrangements agreed with the European Commission, only eight of the 
banks still have to raise in total €6 billion in the period up to October 2015. 
Figure 18. Overlap between banks directly supervised by the ECB under the SSM, 
banks subject to the ECB AQR and/or the EBA stress test 
 
 
Source: de Groen & Lannoo (2014). 
The list was later narrowed down to 120 institutions, the ‘significant’ 
banks, accounting for almost 85% of total banking assets in the euro area, 
and published jointly with the list of ‘less significant’ banks on 4 September 
2014. The list illustrates the huge diversity of banking structures in Europe, 
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discussed in the previous chapter, with France having four large banks with 
assets in excess of €1 trillion, compared to only one in Germany. But the latter 
country has a long list of less significant banks.15  
2.2 The SSM operational structure 
Merging 18 different supervisory authorities into one operational structure 
is a monumental task. Not only does it pose pure operational challenges, but 
also political and cultural ones as well. It is not unprecedented in the history 
of European integration – the start of monetary union in 1994 with the 
European Monetary Institute was a comparable effort – but the lead time was 
much longer, in the context of a smaller EU and EMU. 
The central elements of the SSM operational structure are the 
Supervisory Board and the Joint Supervisory Teams. The Supervisory 
Board is composed of a chair, a vice-chair, four ECB representatives and the 
representatives of all of the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). Also 
the eventual opt-ins all having equal voting rights.16 The Supervisory Board, 
however, is subordinate to the ECB’s Governing Council, which ultimately 
decides, and in which the opt-ins are not represented.17  The concerns of the 
opt-ins may thus not be sufficiently taken into account. An appeals process 
is foreseen in a decision by the ECB’s Governing Council for opt-ins, but they 
remain second-tier. 
Opt-ins have an additional disadvantage, i.e. they cannot take part in 
the liquidity-providing operations of ECB, unless they have substantial 
operations and collateral in the eurozone. Moreover, as long as the opt-ins 
are not part of the euro area, the risk that they may opt-out again will hinder 
their financial institutions. Hence, even if the facility of opting into the SSM 
is a good way to bridge the gap between the ins and the outs, the playing 
field remains uneven.  
                                                   
15 Listed at www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssm-listofsupervisedentities 
1409en.pdf and Annex 6, Key statistics on banks supervised by the ECB (2013). 
16 Other voting rules (qualified and double majority) apply in the Supervisory Board 
for the adoption of regulations (see SSM Regulation Art. 26.7 and the amendments 
to the ECB Rules of Procedure, 22 January 2014). 
17 The decision-making process is based on a ‘non-objection’ procedure. If the 
Governing Council does not object to a draft decision proposed by the Supervisory 
Board within a defined period of time, which may not exceed 10 working days, the 
decision is deemed adopted. See Article 26.8 of the SSM Regulation, Article 13g of 
ECB Rules of Procedure and ECB (2104c), Guide to Banking Supervision, p. 12. 
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The Supervisory Board is assisted by a Steering Committee, which is 
responsible for preparing its meetings. It has a more limited composition and 
follows a rotational system, to ensure a balanced composition of NCAs. But 
it has no formal decision-making capacity. 
The Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) should be the big game changer 
of the SSM. These teams will be in charge of the day-to-day supervision of 
those banks that are the responsibility of the ECB. They will be composed of 
ECB and NCA representatives. They will replace, at least for the SSM, the 
function of the Colleges of Supervisors of banks exclusively active in SSM 
countries, and should ensure a more balanced, more efficient and less biased 
supervision of cross-border banks. Their size and composition will vary 
depending upon the supervised institutions. The chair as well as the core 
team (except sub-coordinators) will be part of the ECB staff, and the full team 
will be a combination of local and international staff from the ECB and 
NCAs. The chair cannot come from the same country as the home country of 
the bank. He/she can delegate specific tasks and liaise with sub-coordinators 
of the NCAs. The SSM Regulation states that the “exchange and secondment 
of staff should establish a common supervisory culture”, on which the ECB 
should report on a regular basis (Recital 79). Danielle Nouy, Chair of the ECB 
Supervisory Board, announced further details of the JSTs on 30 September 
2014: “We will be a truly pan-European supervisor operating without 
national bias or prejudice.” For example, she indicated that Crédit Agricole’s 
chief supervisor will be a German national, Unicredit’s from France and 
ABN AMRO’s from Spain.18 
The composition of the Joint Supervisory Teams was further detailed 
in the April 2014 ECB Regulation and in the September 2014 Banking 
Supervision Guide (see Figure 18). These documents state that the ECB is in 
charge of the establishment and the composition of joint supervisory teams, 
and that it can modify the appointments made by NCAs (Art. 4, ECB 
Regulation). JSTs are appointed for a period of three to five years, depending 
on the risk profile and complexity of the institution. JST coordinators and 
members are expected to rotate on a regular basis. The challenge will be to 
acquire the necessary expertise about the 120 banks in the ECB, to compose 
balanced and competent teams, to make the JSTs work effectively together 
and to avoid duplication of effort between the NCAs. The human resource 
management skills of the ECB will thus be crucial.  
 
                                                   
18 Op-ed published in various European newspapers, 30 September 2014. 
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Figure 18. Organisational pyramid of the JSTs 
 
Source: Giacomo Caviglia, ECB, presentation to the Task Force, 5 May 2014; Guide to 
Banking Supervision, p. 16. 
Whereas Colleges of Supervisors were already multinational, the big 
change for the SSM is the single centre, the ECB. Previously, the home 
country was in charge of final supervision, with a reporting line from the 
host-country authorities, resulting in an EU-wide spaghetti pattern. Under 
the new model, the ECB will establish the Supervisory College and serve as 
chair for the banks for which it acts as consolidating supervisor. The 
members from NCAs within the SSM can participate as observers. For 
significant banks from outside the SSM, the ECB will participate in the 
Colleges as member, and the NCAs as observers (Art. 10, ECB Regulation). 
The challenge will be to make the transition to the new structure as fluid as 
possible, avoiding abrupt changes and the imposition of too many new 
requirements on banks, to ensure the end goal: adequate supervision. 
A key element for the JST and the SSM is the language regime. As a 
general rule, the supervised entities may address the ECB in any one of the 
official languages of the EU. Decisions addressed to supervised entities will 
be adopted in English and the official language of the home member state. 
The ECB will nevertheless allow the banks to use only one official EU 
language in their written communications, including with regard to ECB 
supervisory decisions (Art. 24, ECB Regulation). For communications 
between the ECB and the NCAs, English will be used as a rule, although it is 
not the standard for most NCAs and supervisors in the member states, and 
forms a big challenge for the functioning of the JST, as an enormous amount 
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of relevant information of the supervised entities is available only in the 
national language. With a view to ensuring a fluid transition, the ECB will 
need to be pragmatic, with core documents in English, and supporting 
documents in the home-country language of the bank. This means that most 
banks in the SSM, of which only two countries uses English as the official 
language (Ireland and Malta), will need to move to dual-language 
documentation, which is a huge challenge. But once the system becomes 
truly functional, it will be a big step forward towards a common supervisory 
culture and also for a common understanding of reporting and data.  
The costs incurred by the ECB for the SSM and its supervisory activities 
will be paid for by contributions from all the SSM Banks, following the SSM 
Regulation (Art. 30). The ECB estimated that this will amount to about €260 
million for 2015. A draft paper was circulated setting out the methodology 
for calculating the contributions. This does not impact the respective national 
systems, where the cost of supervision is accounted for in different ways. 
Many banks will thus end up paying over and beyond the national 
contributions. 
2.3 Common definitions for supervisory reporting and data 
processing 
A prerequisite for a Single Supervisory Mechanism and the JST are common 
definitions for supervisory reporting and an integrated IT infrastructure. 
Here, the ECB can build on the work undertaken jointly with the EBA in 
recent years. But unravelling and assessing the progress achieved in this 
domain is not a trivial task and challenges remain. In addition, as 
supervisory reporting is related to financial reporting and to the IT 
framework used, allegiance to this framework must be maintained to avoid 
duplication and confusion.  
Harmonised reporting requirements are required by CRD IV, but 
work on the subject started well before, with the financial reporting 
(FINREP) and common reporting (COREP) work of the EBA and its 
predecessor CEBS in 2006. FINREP introduces standardised data formats 
and definitions for financial reporting for prudential purposes, which use 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) templates. This is 
complemented by COREP for reporting of the capital adequacy and own 
funds ratios, as set forward in the CRD. The aim is to provide supervisors 
with all relevant information on the financial institutions’ risk exposure, as 
well as their capital and liquidity positions. COREP and FINREP use 
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Extended Business Reporting Language (XBRL) that sets a common 
taxonomy for financial reporting, compatible with IFRS.  
Initially, the supervisory reporting framework gave too much 
flexibility to national supervisors, as it was too accommodating to the 
different national reporting formats, which was clear from the huge number 
of cells through which banks could report core (1,277 cells) and detailed 
(21,606 cells) prudential information.  The maximum number of cells that 
banks could be asked to use was about 18,000, as not all information was 
applicable to all banks at the same time (CEBS, 2006). On top of that, COREP 
and FINREP were implemented to varying degrees across member states 
(see ECB, 2010, p. 62). 
The financial crisis, CRDIV and the advent of SSM produced an in-
depth review of COREP and FINREP, which led to the Commission 
Implementing Regulation No 680/2014 on supervisory reporting. But it also 
contained an extension towards large exposures, leverage, liquidity, stable 
funding, asset encumbrance, forbearance and non-performing exposures. 
The Regulation uses a Data Point Model to reconcile different reporting 
frameworks with their respective IT solutions, with a view towards avoiding 
unjustified implementation and operating costs, so as to ensure that the 
different IT solutions in place produce harmonised data as well as reliable 
data quality. The 2014 supervisory reporting regulation follows maximum 
harmonisation, and has not reduced the number of reporting cells, but made 
the data formats identical across member states (see Figure 19).  
But much of this remains work in progress. Amendments were 
proposed in July 2014 to the 2014 supervisory reporting Regulation covering 
non-performing exposures (NPE) and forbearance. A non-performing 
exposure is defined as every material exposure that is 90 days past due even 
if it is not recognised as in default or impaired.19 But this does not affect the 
payment cycles in EU member states, which vary widely (between 1 to 4 
months). In August, the EBA also published a new XBRL taxonomy to be 
used by competent authorities by the end of 2014 for remittance of data 
under the EBA Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) on supervisory 
reporting. It replaces the existing one that was released in September 2013. 
                                                   
19 See EBA draft implementing technical standards (ITS) on supervisory reporting 
on forbearance and non-performing exposures under Article 99(4) of Regulation 
(EU) No 575/2013, 24 July 2014. The ITS came into force in September 2014 with first 
reporting on 31 December 2014. 
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Figure 19. Technical standards on supervisory reporting 
 
Source: EBA (2014). 
The ECB’s October 2014 Asset Quality Review used the latest 
definitions on NPE of the EBA, resulting in a much higher level of NPE 
provisions than before. Overall, 28% of the banks used a NPE definition that 
was less conservative than the AQR, compared to 15% that used a more 
conservative definition, leading to an increase of €55 billion on the NPE 
book. This added up to €81 billion as a consequence of the credit file review 
in the context of the AQR, resulting in an additional €136 billion in 
provisions. The overall increases among SSM debtor countries ranged from 
7% to 116%, with the largest percentage increases for shipping finance, but 
in terms of volume, the most was for large SMEs and corporate finance, 
followed by real estate (ECB, 2014e, p. 67). 
The relationship with IFRS forms an additional difficulty that was 
clearly brought to the fore by the financial crisis (see Nouy, 2014). The IFRS 
relies heavily on fair-value accounting, but this only provides useful 
information for certain liquid financial assets and liabilities. For various 
other items on a bank’s balance sheet, there is no market information. For 
these items, in the first instance, the use of fair value reduces both the 
verifiability and comparability of the results. Second, the accounting 
standards allowed for a delayed recognition of credit losses on loans and 
debt instruments or ‘impairment charges’, as they required observable 
indicators that signal a default of the counterparty. Third, there was no 
accounting rule for off-balance sheet exposures, such as for Special Purpose 
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Entities (SPEs). At the request of the G-20, the International Accounting 
Standards Board has already come up with improved rules on fair-value 
recognition and additional disclosure towards SPEs, and is working on a 
model for more timely recognition of credit losses. But a downside is the 
continued divergence between the EU and the US on global accounting rules.  
More may have to be done to maintain the link between IFRS and 
supervisory reporting. In a speech on accounting and financial reporting for 
central banks, Danielle Nouy asked standard setters to consider the financial 
stability implications of any revisions to existing accounting rules or when 
developing new ones and to identify, analyse and – where feasible – mitigate 
the potential pro-cyclical effects of financial reporting. But, more 
importantly, she insisted that the ECB wanted to continue to use financial 
reporting standards as a basis for supervisory reporting (see Nouy, 2014). 
This has two important implications: i) that, internationally, progress must 
be achieved towards a single accounting standard, while improving the 
quality of the standards and ii) that also within Europe, the use of IFRS must 
be broadened, which is not required for non-listed corporations, including 
many of the 120 banks the ECB will supervise.  
The ECB therefore launched a consultation in October 2014 to extend 
the uniform supervisory financial reporting requirement (FINREP, based 
upon IFRS) to a significant number of supervised groups applying national 
GAAPs, taking proportionality into account. In the AQR, the ECB already 
made valuation adjustments for €4.6 billion to the banks supervised by the 
ECB as a result of the fair value exposures review (ECB, 2014e, p. 93). This 
implies that the ECB de facto already started to apply one standard, even if 
the SSM Regulation explicitly states that accounting standards do not fall 
within its reach (Recital 19).  
2.4 Supervisory tasks of the ECB and of the NCAs 
The split between the ECB and NCAs is two-fold: the ECB supervises the 
significant institutions of the participating states of the SSM, and only in the 
prudential field. Supervision of the other institutions and the other tasks are 
left to the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). Or to express the 
arrangement differently, the original EU form of supervision continues to 
apply where the ECB is not the supervisor, with the division of competences 
between home- and host-country supervisors. But some important 
exceptions to the ECB’s competences are set in the capital requirements 
Directive and Regulation (CRDIV), and in the draft ‘Barnier’ proposals on 
the structure of banks. The ECB can mandate NCAs to cooperate closely with 
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the ECB and override their decisions in its fields of competence, but evidence 
will need to indicate how this will function. This may even be more difficult 
towards the non-eurozone countries that opt-in to the SSM (see Table 3 for 
an overview of the relevant prudential supervisors for credit institutions and 
branches). 
Table 3. Relevant prudential supervisors for credit institutions/branches in the EEA 
Type of bank Area in which credit institution/branch is located 
 Euro area Other EU Other EEA Third 
 (SSM) SSM Non-SSM (Non-SSM) (Non-
SSM) 
Parent credit institution domiciled in SSM area 
Significant 
(Group) 
ECB ECB .. .. .. 
- Subsidiary ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch ECB ECB ECB ECB NCA 
Less 
significant 
(Group) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB .. .. .. 
- Subsidiary NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch (F)NCA/ECB  (F)NCA/ECB FNCA/ECB FNCA/ECB NCA 
Parent credit institution domiciled in non-SSM EEA area 
Signif. & less-
sign. (Group) 
.. .. NCA NCA .. 
- Subsidiary 
(Signif.) 
ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Less-signif.) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch FNCA FNCA (F)NCA (F)NCA FNCA 
Parent credit institution domiciled in non-EEA area 
Signif. & less-
signif. 
(Group) 
.. .. .. .. NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Signif.) 
ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Less-signif.) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch .. .. .. .. NCA 
Note: Significant institutions are credit institutions that have more than €30 billion assets; 
represent more than 20% of GDP and at least €5 billion assets; are among three largest credit 
institutions in the member state; or have more than significant cross-border assets. The grey 
coloured parts indicate the areas in which the SSM contributed to a change in supervision. 
NCA = National Competent Authority; FNCA = Foreign National Competent Authority. 
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The division of labour for passporting between the ECB and the 
NCAs is a more complex process than indicated above, and was detailed in 
the ECB’s SSM framework Regulation (April 2014) and the Guide to Banking 
Supervision (September 2014). The passporting procedure continues even 
for the significant banks to follow EU law, i.e. a bank wishing to provide 
services or to set up a branch in another SSM or non-SSM state needs to 
inform its NCA, who then informs the ECB (Arts 11-12, SSM Framework 
Regulation). For banks from non-participating states, the same applies. The 
ECB will exercise the powers of the home- and host-member state. One may 
wonder whether it still makes sense to maintain the detour of the notification 
to NCAs for significant banks within the eurozone. 
Although CRDIV was negotiated at the same time that the SSM 
initiative was launched, it leaves important prudential supervisory tasks 
explicitly to National Competent Authorities. The Directive and Regulation 
make explicit reference to “Member States”, as compared to “competent 
authorities”, regarding the determination of capital buffers, macro-
prudential buffers or the reduced weightings for mortgage debt. The 
requirements to set institution-specific capital and systemic risk buffers is 
fully left to the member states (CRD, Arts 128-140). Likewise for the 
requirements to set macro-prudential buffers (CRR, Art. 458). But the 
freedom left to member states is clearly defined, and the Council has the 
power to reject the proposed national macro-prudential measures in 
accordance with Article 291 TFEU (Implementing Acts), acting on a proposal 
by the Commission. 
Reduced risk weightings for mortgage debt apply under the external 
ratings-based or standardised approach of Basel II (CRD, Art. 124). The 
general rule is a 35% risk weighting for loans secured by residential property 
and 50% for commercial property, but ‘member states’ can ask for more 
rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in 
statutory or regulatory provisions. In this case, however, the attribution of 
these competences is not as clear in the article as it is for the capital buffers, 
as it refers mostly to ‘competent authorities’. A higher risk weight will be set 
based on loss experience and taking into account forward-looking markets 
developments and financial stability considerations, and be based on EBA 
standards. Host-country rules apply in case of cross-border activity. 
The SSM Regulation allows the ECB to set higher requirements for 
capital buffers and macro-prudential risks than those laid down in the 
CRDIV, and “any national competent authority” can ask the ECB to act in 
this sense (Art. 5, 2-3). The ECB, when doing so, shall cooperate closely with 
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the NCAs. It needs to notify the member state in question and state the 
reasons. In doing so, the ECB needs to take the specific situation of the 
member state into account. 
Other elements of the CRDIV fall in a grey zone between the ECB and 
the NCAs, such as for example the leverage and liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR), until they will be fully implemented in 2018. In the meantime, 
member states may impose national requirements or require a faster 
transition. In the Netherlands, for example, a 4% leverage ratio by 2018 was 
imposed as a ‘Pillar II’ issue, which falls under the discretion of the 
supervisor. The LCR will only be introduced from 2015 onwards, but its 
application to branches is a host-country competence; hence, the NCAs will 
regulate, meaning again that no single rule exists.  
Under the Barnier (or Liikanen) proposal on the structure of banking 
(European Commission, 2014c), the ECB may have an additional but delicate 
supervisory task, if adopted, which is to require large banks to separate their 
trading activities from their ordinary deposit-taking and lending business. 
The draft prohibits proprietary trading, but allows trading for market 
making, hedging and underwriting purposes. The draft leaves this task with 
the ‘competent authorities’, but will this be the ECB under the SSM? This 
could apply for Global SIFIs, and for banks having trading activities above a 
certain threshold. The ECB, or the NCAs outside the SSM, would have to 
review the permissible trading activities of such banks, and if they find that 
some pose a threat to financial stability, they could require the institution to 
separate its entities into a banking group. But derogation from this 
requirement could be requested by the member states for national legislation 
adopted before January 2014, to be approved by the European Commission 
(Art. 21). Hence member states would need to lobby the Commission for 
their legislation on banking structures to be accepted before the ECB imposes 
separation. The French, German and British legislation on the subject, all 
adopted before the Commission proposal, do not go as far as Europe has 
gone, or call for implementing separation in a different way. 
2.5 The division of labour between the ECB and the EBA 
The division of labour, at least within the SSM, seems to be clear-cut: the ECB 
is in charge of prudential supervision, and the EBA is the standard setter. 
However, the split is not so sharp. The EBA also has supervisory tasks, such 
as data collection, stress tests and participation in Supervisory Colleges, 
whereas the ECB can adopt its own rules. Moreover, the ECB is not formally 
represented on the EBA board; this remains exclusively the role of the 
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member states. These issues are also relevant for the other ESAs, and the 
entire European System of Financial Supervisors, and in particular for the 
ESRB, although the latter’s secretariat is based within the ECB.  
The Regulation governing the European Banking Authority (EBA) was 
modified at the same time that the SSM was adopted. It basically changes the 
voting procedures in the Board of Supervisors to allow for a positive co-
existence between the SSM members and non-members, requiring qualified 
majorities in both groups for measures adopted by the EBA. The Regulation 
also allows a representative of the ECB’s Supervisory Board to participate in 
the EBA Board of Supervisors, without a right to vote, and to attend 
discussions within the Board of Supervisors relating to individual financial 
institutions (Art. 44.4). The ECB is thus not formally represented as a 
supervisor within the EBA.  
Confusion may emerge in markets concerning who is in charge, and 
duplication in reporting by banks can be an issue. The EBA conducted its 
2014 stress tests on 123 banks, which were not an entirely comparable sample 
of banks and using different configurations of banking groups from the 130 
banks on which the ECB was applying its comprehensive assessment.20 The 
end result was well coordinated, using the same methodology and the same 
data formats, and was welcomed by the markets, but duplication may have 
occurred in reporting, at least for the banks supervised by the ECB, and some 
resistance could emerge, also towards future stress tests.21 Hence extensive 
coordination between both organisations should continue to be a priority. 
Other supervisory tasks of EBA include the participation in 
Supervisory Colleges, conducting peer reviews of supervisors, mediating 
between supervisors and resolution authorities and delegating 
responsibilities. As regards the Colleges, the EBA stresses that it will 
continue to play an important role in Colleges where the consolidating 
supervisor is outside the SSM. Some 105 colleges were identified by the EBA 
during the course of 2013, of which 43 are being closely monitored. Some 
73% of these are headquartered inside the SSM, and the remainder outside 
the SSM (19%) or third countries (7%). The EBA says that “the number of 
colleges will be only slightly affected by the introduction of SSM” and “that 
only five banking groups will have presence only inside SSM countries”. 
Hence “cross-border aspects in supervisory cooperation will remain 
                                                   
20 See Figure 18. 
21 See article at: https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-common-
methodology-and-scenario-for-2014-eu-banks-stress-test. 
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significant also after SSM is in place” (EBA, 2014). In our view, the start of 
SSM should allow for a significant decline in the number of statutory 
supervisors present in a College, and make supervision more consistent. On 
peer reviews, the question arises whether this also applies within the SSM, 
and to the ECB.  
In its report on the ESAs, the European Commission did not address 
these, or other sensitive matters. On the contrary, it recommended that “the 
focus on supervisory convergence could be increased”, but without 
mentioning the role of the ECB under the SSM (European Commission, 
2014a). It calls for swifter decision-making within the EBA, but without 
raising the issue of representation, and the non-voting right of the ECB in the 
EBA, and of the chair and managing directors of EBA.  On the budget, the 
Commission suggests revisiting the current financing arrangements, which 
is based on a 40% contribution of the EU budget and 60% from the member 
states, without recommending a specific change. In the Staff Working 
Document, however, it raises the possibility of contributions from the 
supervised institutions.22 
The European Parliament, from its side, in its report on the European 
System of Financial Supervisors, went much further, and called for a full 
review of respective regulations, covering as well the governance and the 
role of the chair, the powers of and the rule-making by the ESAs and the 
European Commission and the role of the ESRB within the ECB. As regards 
the EBA, it asked for a thorough assessment of its tasks and mandate in view 
of the start of SSM (European Parliament, 2014). The Commission has thus 
chosen to duck the debate. 
Confronted with a possible duplication of rule-making because of the 
start of the SSM, the EBA and the European Commission, as the endorser of 
secondary legislation, should be extremely vigilant to monitor and control 
the regulatory output. The establishment of the single rule book is a 
noteworthy objective, but it could lead to an almost unstoppable process. In 
2013-14, with the implementation of CRD/CRR, the EBA issued or is in the 
process of issuing 75 RTS (regulatory technical standards) and ITS 
(implementing technical standards) (49 RTS and 26 ITS).23 In a report for the 
European Parliament, experts called for a Structured Single Rulebook. 
ESAs should apply a ‘think-small principle’ when developing new 
                                                   
22 See European Commission (2014a). 
23 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/acts/rts/index_en.htm 
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implementing measures and apply proportioned rules to small- and 
medium-sized businesses. ESAs should also measure the impact of their 
proposals on other regulated entities and assess any unintended 
consequences on the EU economy (Demarigny et al., 2013). Others have 
called for more consistency across different RTSs and ITSs, or to group them 
according to themes.  
 
 
 
The problem is that the secondary legislative process is almost 
entirely under the control of the European Commission. The European 
Parliament and the Council have 3+3 months to react on an RTS, but they 
can only reject them if they do not agree (Art. 13 EBA Regulation). On ITSs, 
there is no direct control by European Parliament and the Council. The huge 
rule-making activity also raises the question of consistent implementation 
and application across the EU. Some level 2-acts are regulations, and thus 
directly applicable, whereas others are directives. EBA and the European 
Commission have a Q&A for interpretation of level 2-legislation, which 
almost has the force of law, but this is not an ideal situation. Now that the 
huge rule-making post-crisis is (almost) over, it is time to reconsider the 
Box 1. Technical standards and the Single Rulebook 
Delegated and implementing acts, or secondary legislation under EU law, 
introduced by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, form the basis for the single rulebook. 
A delegated act gives the European Commission the power to adopt non-
legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-
essential elements of the legislative act (Art. 290 TFEU). An implementing 
act will be adopted “where uniform conditions for implementing legally 
binding Union acts are needed”, which can confer implementing powers on 
the Commission (Art. 291, TFEU). Implementing acts are endorsed by the 
Commission, with a ‘droit de regard’ of the Council and European 
Parliament, whereas a draft delegated act may be rejected by the EU Council 
and European Parliament, and the delegation revoked at any time. This will 
not affect previous acts. 
In Single Rulebook language, Regulatory Technical Standards (RTSs) 
are adopted by the Commission by means of a Delegated Act (Arts 10-14, 
ESA regulations) and Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) are adopted 
by means of an Implementing Act (Art. 15 ESAs regulations). An overview 
of the hundreds of Level 2-measures in the area of financial services is 
available from the Commission website. 
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effectiveness and appropriateness of the single rulebook objective. 
Inspiration could be drawn from the REFIT exercise that is being applied in 
other areas (see Box 2 below).  
 
Box 2. The Commission’s REFIT programme 
The European Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) 
programme was launched in 2012 to simplify EU law and reduce regulatory 
costs, with the ultimate aim of fostering growth and job creation. Conceived 
as a rolling programme, REFIT is built on four pillars:  
1. Simplification of existing rules and reduction of administrative burdens;  
2. Repeal of obsolete legislation;  
3. Withdrawal of proposals that are stuck in the ordinary legislative 
procedure; and  
4. Evaluation and fitness checks.  
Arguably, the latter are one of the most interesting novelties under 
REFIT. Fitness checks assess the efficiency, effectiveness, costs, and coherence 
of EU legislation in a given policy area or sector. As such, they break from the 
traditional approach of evaluating a single act/policy and move the focus to 
an entire sector, thus allowing a deeper understanding of how different pieces 
of the acquis interact with one another and impact on a policy area or a sector. 
Nevertheless, the methodology to perform fitness checks as well as their 
relation with other better regulation tools such as e.g. cumulative cost 
assessments, is not entirely clear. 
As regards the simplification of existing legislation, by the second half 
of 2014, action had been taken on e.g. electronic VAT invoicing, public 
procurement, chemicals legislation, accounting and financial reporting. 
About 50 of the pending proposals will be withdrawn, in agreement with 
Parliament and Council. Fitness checks are planned for EU nature legislation, 
general food law and waste legislation. The implementation of REFIT is 
running in parallel with a general overhaul of the EU better regulation 
strategy. The Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines of 2009 are 
currently under revision, and evaluation and consultation guidelines will also 
be updated in the coming months. 
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2.6 The division of labour between the ECB and ESRB 
The possible duplication of tasks applies as well to the ESRB, but in that case, 
for an organisation based within the ECB. Everything depends on the 
effective cooperation established between the Supervisory Board of the SSM, 
which also has macro-prudential tasks, the ESRB, which is not supposed to 
look at individual institutions and the member states. Here again, the 
Commission report on the functioning of the ESRB was silent on the division 
of competences with the SSM and the possible replication of tasks (European 
Commission, 2014b).  
The broader questions are: what should macro-prudential regulation 
do, and should it be a task of the central bank? On the first element, a 
consensus exists that it should tackle systemic risk, smoothen the financial 
cycle and limit contagion, but the questions remain how, and how far it 
should go. Tackling certain indicators may not be sufficient, or may lead to 
strong reactions from certain interest groups. Hence the results will always 
be sub-optimal. Locating the function in a central bank raises the additional 
problem of whether macro-prudential considerations should be part of the 
monetary policy stance. Macro-prudential tasks could divert attention from 
the inflation target, create conflicts of interest or politicise the central bank. 
The Fed, as well as the ECB, have indicated that financial stability is the task 
of macro-prudential policy bodies, whereas interest-rate policy pursues 
macro-economic targets (Portes, 2014). The danger posed by deflation to 
financial stability, however, emphasises that it is difficult to maintain a clear 
separation between both policies and makes it imperative that the central 
bank takes action, which is the view of the BIS. Or expressed the other way 
around, a deflationary environment will require even more action on the 
macro-prudential side. Hence, both are complementary. 
Locating the macro-prudential function within the ECB has fostered 
the necessary cooperation, which should also facilitate global coordination. 
Even under the SSM, member states and national designated authorities 
retain important competences, such as for financial stability and macro-
prudential buffers (see e.g. CRR Art. 458) for banks, subject to a coordination 
with EU bodies to avoid negative spill-over effects. The ESRB highlights that 
implementing these macro-prudential instruments needs to be part of a 
strategy, and that they need to be coordinated. But the problem is that the 
ESRB, unlike for example the British Financial Policy Committee, can only 
issue recommendations on the subject. In 2011, the ESRB issued a 
recommendation to the national authorities to assign, in their national 
legislation, a single national macro-prudential body in charge of financial 
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stability with a clear mandate, statute, means and structures to monitor and 
mitigate macro-prudential risks. In the 2013 Annual Report, published in 
July 2014, the ESRB noted that there have been substantial delays in 
implementing this provision (ESRB, 2014, p. 56), and that the 
operationalisation of macro-prudential policy across the EU is still work in 
progress (ESRB, 2014, p. 49). A problem is that the tasks have been assigned 
to different authorities in the EU, mostly the central banks, but also the FSA 
and a separate committee (Schoenmaker, 2014). In addition, the ESRB 
complained that the data received from national authorities leave much to 
be desired. The culprit of this situation is that the SSM, or the micro-
prudential arm of the ECB, may take over the macro-prudential function, as 
it has clear powers to oversee and, if necessary, to override NCAs, but only 
within the SSM. 
Hence the future role of the ESRB within the ECB is unclear, in the 
context of the SSM. On the one hand, it is a useful network to further the 
discussion on the policy framework to tackle macro-prudential risks within 
the EU as a whole, although other fora exist for this as well. On the other 
hand, also the SSM will have macro-prudential powers, at least for the Ins. 
The SSM side will have much more accurate and harmonised data, and more 
capacity to act. Of course, like with all micro-supervisors, the crucial 
question is whether it will see the bigger picture? 
2.7 Summing-up: A challenging task ahead 
The ECB will have to maintain its credibility as a central bank, set a high 
standard as supervisor, and demonstrate that both tasks can be combined 
under one roof. The advantage of the combination is that the ECB will be 
much better informed than in the past about the state of the European 
financial system. The disadvantage is that it may blur its tasks, which may 
undermine the effectiveness of both policies. This could be aggravated by 
the complexity of the structure under which it has to work, as outlined 
above.  
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3. BANKING UNION PILLARS II AND III: 
SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM 
AND DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
esides the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Banking Union 
is built around two other main pillars, i.e. the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) and the deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) 
Directive. This chapter describes the main elements of these two other 
cornerstones of Banking Union as well as their interaction with the SSM.  
3.1 Resolution: the BRRD, SRM and state aid 
The agreements on the bank recovery and resolution Directive (BRRD) and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second pillar of Banking Union, 
were milestones. One of the key objectives is to ensure that insolvent banks 
can be resolved in an orderly and uniform manner in the EU without state 
aid. A single resolution board will play a key role in ensuring that this 
process unfolds under a unique governance structure, at least for the 
eurozone. A single bank resolution fund should function as the backstop in 
Banking Union, breaking the link between the funding costs of the bank and 
the sovereign. None of this structure was in place when the financial crisis 
hit: no member state had a separate bank resolution authority nor were there 
resolution funds or a European structure to coordinate bail-outs, apart from 
the EU’s state aid control authority. Combined with the mandatory bail-in 
and pre-funded deposit guarantee schemes, the building blocks are now in 
place to deal with a crisis in banking, and shield banks from direct access to 
taxpayers’ money. 
But will there be no more state aid? The SRM still allows for emergency 
liquidity assistance (ELA) by the national central banks and guarantees or 
equity purchases by the member states, in which case state aid rules can 
apply. State aid rules will also apply insofar as the European Commission 
could impose conditions on the use of resolution funds, in line with the 
principles applied during the financial crisis, such as burden-sharing with 
other debt holders and behavioural constraints. The single resolution fund 
B
44 | BANKING UNION PILLARS II AND III 
will take some time to be well-funded and its future size will also be too 
small in comparison to the size of the eurozone banking sector, but the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) can be used as the ultimate, although 
not unlimited backstop (the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument) as was 
clarified by the Eurogroup on 10 June 2014. 
Any discussion today on the backstop in the Banking Union thus has 
to start from the new structure, although the transition period raises some 
questions. The SRM will be applicable from 2016 onwards, but the board will 
become operational from 2015 onwards. The EU Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD) should be implemented by 2015, but its 
provisions on bail-in will only apply from 2016. Lastly, there are the EU’s 
state aid rules, on which the Commission has published its ultimate post-
crisis guidelines in July 2013. They require, for the time being, only bail-in of 
subordinated debt. 
It should be recalled that harmonisation attempts of bank resolution 
are almost as old as the single market. Proposals have been made since the 
end of the 1980s to harmonise winding-up procedures of banks, in line with 
the home country control principle of the free provision of financial services 
directives. A first directive on the re-organisation and winding up of credit 
institutions (Directive 2001/24/EC) was adopted in 2001 after many years of 
discussion. It introduced the principles of unity and universality of 
liquidation procedures, and required the home member state authorities of 
a bank to have sole jurisdiction over a bank and their decisions to be 
recognised in all the other member states. It sets that the law of the home 
member state determines all the effects of re-organisation measures or 
winding-up proceedings. The degree of harmonisation was minimal, 
supervisory practices too divergent, and the principles of information 
sharing between home and host left much to be desired. In the few cases of 
bank failures that occurred for banks with EU-wide operations after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, such as the Icelandic banks or Fortis, host-
country rules were applied, meaning that host-country authorities took over 
the operations of a foreign bank. A much more far-reaching harmonisation 
was thus needed, which the BRRD and SRM undertake. 
This part reviews the main principles introduced by BRRD and SRM 
and analyses the interaction with EU state aid rules. It addresses the question 
of how bank recovery and resolution will function from now onwards in the 
EU, and what questions remain to be resolved.  
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3.1.1 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’s (BRRD) ambit 
The degree of harmonisation of the BRRD is far-reaching and addresses in 
detail the planning of recovery and resolution by banks and resolution 
authorities, the need for early intervention, the bail-in of senior debt-holders 
and other resolution tools, and the creation of a resolution fund. Even if the 
BRRD is a directive, it is far-reaching, in a field where even national laws 
were unclear in the powers for authorities until today. It is a major step 
forward and can be expected to influence the rules beyond the banking 
industry.  
The focal point of the BRRD is the minimum of 8% contractual bail-
in instruments as a share of total assets (Art. 44), which will apply from 
2016 onwards. When losses affect the minimum capital base, common equity 
tier 1 items are reduced in proportion to the losses, and additional tier 1, tier 
2 instruments and certain other liabilities (senior debt) are converted into 
capital. An independent valuation of the assets and liabilities of the 
institution will therefore be undertaken before taking resolution action or 
exercising the power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments 
(Art. 36). This valuation will “not assume any potential future provision of 
extraordinary public financial support or central bank emergency liquidity 
assistance or any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-
standard collateralization” (Art. 37.5).  
A bail-in requires that banks’ balance sheets have sufficient liabilities 
that can be bailed in, in a progressive and hierarchical manner. The bail-in 
can apply to all liabilities, with the exception of covered deposits, covered 
bonds and other collateralised instruments, short-term liabilities, and 
liabilities related to fiduciary functions on the bank (Art. 44).  
The bail-in is only part of a broader series of options to resolve a bank, 
which are also set out in the Directive. It starts with early intervention, the 
removal of management or the appointment of a temporary administrator 
(Art. 35). Other specific tools discussed include the bridge institution tool, 
the sale of business tool and the asset separation (bad bank) tool (Arts 37-42). 
In each of the cases, the authorities will be vested with appropriate powers 
to be able to undertake these actions, “without obtaining the consent of the 
shareholders of the institutions under resolution or any third party other 
than the bridge institution, and without complying with any procedural 
requirements under company or securities law” (Art. 42.1). “When applying 
the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, Member States 
shall ensure that they comply with the Union State aid framework, where 
applicable” (Art. 34.3). 
46 | BANKING UNION PILLARS II AND III 
If these actions are not sufficient, resolution authorities may make a 
contribution to the institution under resolution to cover losses or shore up 
the capital (Art. 44.4). But this can only be done after the 8% bail-in threshold 
is reached, to an amount not exceeding 5% of liabilities, and in full respect of 
EU state aid rules. The level of capital is set by the group-level resolution 
authority, decided upon in cooperation with host countries, with EBA 
mediating if no decision has been reached between national authorities (Art. 
45). Member states can also provide extraordinary public financial support 
through additional financial stabilisation tools, such as equity support and 
temporary public ownership, but again as a last resort, after all other 
measures have been exploited, and following state aid rules (Arts 56-58). 
A second focal point of the Directive is the requirement to designate 
resolution authorities with all the powers necessary to apply the resolution 
tools described above to institutions and to entities (Arts 62-65). This 
includes the power to take control of an institution under resolution and 
exercise all the rights and powers conferred upon the shareholders. For 
banking groups, resolution colleges will be created, with the group 
consolidating supervisor in the lead. This may include the implementation 
of a group resolution scheme, in case all authorities involved agree (Art. 91). 
But the challenges to the group administrator will be high, as the resolution 
authorities of the host member state can object to the decisions of the group-
level resolution authority, “not only on appropriateness of resolution actions 
and measures but also on ground of the need to protect financial stability in 
that Member State” (recital 97). “The resolution college should not be a 
decision-making body, but a platform facilitating decision-making by 
national authorities. The joint decisions should be taken by the national 
authorities concerned” (recital 98).   
The objectives of resolution are to ensure the continuity of critical 
functions, preserve financial stability and “to protect public funds by 
minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support” (Art. 31). The 
resolution authorities intervene if the determination that the institution is 
failing or is likely to fail has been made by the competent authority. State 
support is still possible to keep an institution afloat if, “in order to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial 
stability” (Art. 32.4d). This “shall be confined to solvent institutions and shall 
be conditional on final approval under the Union State aid framework. Those 
measures shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature and shall be 
proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious disturbance and 
shall not be used to offset losses that the institution has incurred or is likely 
to incur in the near future.” Such support measures “shall be limited to 
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injections necessary to address capital shortfall established in the national, 
Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises 
conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities” (Art. 
32.4d, Art. 16.3d in SRM). These provisions will be reviewed by the 
Commission by 31 December 2015. 
A third key element of the Directive is the establishment of a 
resolution fund, financed by contributions of the banks. By 31 December 
2024, the fund should reach at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of 
all the locally authorised institutions, with the possibility to set target levels 
in excess of that amount. To deal with the resolution of groups, the funds 
should have the power to lend from other funds in the EU, or to mutualise 
the national funds. The fund can only be used to resolve a bank and to 
contribute to a bank under resolution only after the 8% was bailed-in, and 
the resolution financing arrangement may not exceed 5% of the total 
liabilities (Art. 44.5). State aid rules apply when the resolution fund comes 
in. 
A sensible issue in an EU context is how to balance the existence of two 
different resolution strategies: single point of entry (SPE) and the multiple 
point of entry (MPE) approaches. In SPE, the home authority applies 
resolution powers at the top parent company level, ideally the holding 
company, through the absorption of losses by the parent. In MPE, resolution 
powers may be applied differently to different parts of the group, and is 
more adapted to banks with separately capitalised subsidiaries. MPE 
nevertheless requires actions to be coordinated across jurisdictions so as to 
avoid conflicts or inconsistencies that undermine the effectiveness of 
separate resolution actions. 
The BRRD describes in detail how groups may provide financial 
support to any other party to the agreement that meets the conditions for 
early intervention, without it being a prerequisite (Art. 18). MPE may, 
however, lead to disagreements among supervisory authorities on the 
approach to take to a bank in trouble, with the EBA performing the task of 
mediator (Art. 20). This problem should be lifted by the existence of the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), at least for the SSM, although it will 
remain a challenge for the new single resolution board to align different 
countries, and different banks. Excessively loose cooperation between 
supervisors could lead to ring-fencing and strengthen the tendency towards 
subsidiarisation, which could further reduce financial integration in the EU 
and affect financial sector efficiency. 
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3.1.2 Comes the Single Resolution Mechanism  
The SRM regulation creates a centralised but complex system of decision-
making for bank resolution in the eurozone, and for the countries 
participating in the SSM. Through the Intergovernmental Agreement, it will 
be endowed with adequate financing means through the establishment of a 
Fund with a target level of 1% of covered deposits or approximately €55 
billion based on European Commission estimates. This Fund should start to 
irrevocably mutualise national funds by 2016, with 40% of the available 
means within the national compartments in the first year and 60% in the 
second year, and equal amounts in the subsequent six years up to 2024, until 
it is fully mutualised. The Agreement was signed by 26 member states on 21 
May 2014 (all except Sweden and the UK).  
The centralised decision-making structure is composed of one board, 
which can meet in an executive and a plenary session. The board will 
exercise the tasks or powers, which, according to the BRRD, are to be 
exercised by the national resolution authorities (Art. 5). It will draw 
resolution plans for groups within the SSM in cooperation with the national 
authorities, setting the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities. It shall decide on the adoption of a resolution scheme, in 
cooperation with the Commission and the Council. It is composed in its 
executive session of a chair, vice chair and four other members, to be 
operational from 2015 onwards and based in Brussels. The ECB and the 
European Commission will have representatives on the board. It will be 
accountable to the plenary session of all national resolution authorities, to 
the European Parliament and the participating national member states. It 
will be independent and have its own budget, separate from the EU budget, 
funded by contributions from national resolution authorities. Created under 
EU law, however, it will function as an agency of the European Commission, 
and will be political.  
The complexity of the decision-making in the SRM came in for heavy 
criticism during the debates on the draft, raising questions whether it would 
ever work. It essentially involves three bodies: the SRM Board, the European 
Commission and the EU Council. The moment a bank is declared to have 
failed by the SSM, the SRM board must adopt a resolution plan. The decision 
on this plan will be adopted by the SRM Board, in which also delegates from 
the national resolution authorities where the bank is active will participate. 
It will decide with a simple majority, each delegate having one vote. The 
Commission will have 24 hours to object to the plan, or it can ask the Council 
within 12 hours whether it objects to the plan (Art. 18). 
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The complexity of the SRM is aggravated by the fact that the EBA also 
needs to make an assessment of recovery plans of banking groups (see also 
EBA, 2014). Hence the same likelihood of overlaps as between the EBA and 
the ECB for supervision also exists between the EBA and the SRM for 
resolution.  
Another issue of debate was the contributions by a bank to the fund, 
which should be calculated pro-rata to the amount of its liabilities (excluding 
own funds and covered deposits) with respect to the aggregate liabilities 
(excluding own funds and covered deposits) of all the institutions authorised 
in the participating member states. Contributions will be adjusted in 
proportion to the risk profile of each institution. The fund was agreed as an 
intergovernmental agreement “to provide maximum legal certainty”, and 
will come into force once it has been ratified by 90% of the weighted votes of 
signatories.24 
The SRM makes extensive reference to the state aid framework. All aid, 
also from the single resolution fund, must be compatible with the EU’s state 
aid framework. On the one hand, “decisions or actions of the Board, the 
Commission or the Council shall neither require Member States to provide 
extraordinary public financial support nor impinge on the budgetary 
sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States” (Art. 6). On the 
other hand, member states can still provide aid “to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial 
stability”, which refers to the Art. 107.3b of the Treaty, which was also 
invoked during the crisis. This can be composed of guarantees or capital 
support. The latter should “be limited to injections necessary to address 
capital shortfalls established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, 
asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or 
national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent 
authority” (Art. 16.3). But they “shall be conditional on final approval under 
State aid rules” (Art. 16.3). The same applies in case the ESM is used as a 
direct re-capitalisation instrument. This instrument, as clarified by the 
Eurogroup on 10 June 2014, may be activated in case a bank fails to attract 
sufficient capital from private sources, and the ESM member is unable to 
recapitalise. “A bail-in of 8% of all liabilities will be a precondition for using 
the instrument, as well as the resources available in the ESM members’ 
national resolution funds.” The aid will be provided in accordance with EU 
state aid rules. The facility has a recapitalisation capacity of €60 billion. 
                                                   
24 EU Council, Press release, 21 May 2014. 
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3.1.3 The State Aid framework 
The new rules on resolution tie in with the approach of the European 
Commission’s competition authority (DG Comp), which published its 
ultimate guidelines in July 2013. They replace and complement previous 
communications that were published during the financial crisis. The 
Communication clearly establishes that financial stability remains the 
overarching objective for the Commission in reacting to a financial crisis, 
“whilst ensuring that State aid and distortions of competition between banks 
and across Member States are kept to the minimum”. The rules state that 
state aid can only be accepted after hybrid capital and subordinated debt 
holders have contributed to reducing the capital shortfall “to the maximum 
extent” (Art. 41 Communication). But the Commission does “not require a 
contribution from senior debt holders (in particular from insured deposits, 
uninsured deposits, bonds and all other senior debt) as a mandatory 
component” (Art. 42), which is the big difference in the BRRD framework. 
The Communication repeats that future state recapitalisation measures can 
only be accepted on very strict conditions, once other means, such as bail-
ins, have been exhausted, and after a restructuring plan has been accepted 
by the Commission (Arts 29-30). Only in exceptional circumstances, when 
financial stability is at risk, can measures be accepted ex-post (Arts 45-51), 
which does not prevent the compliance with burden-sharing measures. 
Guarantees and liquidity support can be granted before a restructuring plan 
is approved, but only after notification and temporary approval, following 
the conditions set in the previous communications, including adequate 
remuneration, and behavioural restrictions. They are restricted to banks that 
have no capital shortfall (items 56-58).  
These rules, together with the elements of the new broader resolution 
framework, were applied to the Banco Espirito Santo (BES) case (August 
2014), whereby the state capital injection of €4.9 billion to the Bridge Bank 
was authorised by the European Commission. It noted that the full 
contribution of shareholders and of subordinated debt holders to the losses 
of BES was ensured, but that EU state aid rules did not require any 
contribution from depositors or other senior debt-holders. 
The banking Communication also reiterated the conditions for 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by the central bank and support by the 
deposit guarantee schemes. ELA needs to be fully secured by collateral, with 
haircuts and at penalising rates. State guarantees on ELA will be considered 
state aid, and the use of deposit guarantee funds, in case they are used for 
restructuring purposes, may constitute state aid and will be assessed by the 
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Commission (Items 62-63).25 Also the ECB restated its policy with regard to 
ELA in October 2013, noting that it is limited “to a solvent financial 
institution, or group of solvent financial institutions, that is facing temporary 
liquidity problems, without such operation being part of the single monetary 
policy. Responsibility for the provision of ELA lies with the NCB(s) 
concerned. This means that any costs of, and the risks arising from, the 
provision of ELA are incurred by the relevant NCB.” But NCBs should 
inform the ECB of the details of any ELA operation daily, and should obtain 
ex-ante approval for any operation exceeding a threshold of €500 million.26 
Under the SSM, making the solvency assessment should be easier as the ECB 
should have the information on hand, avoiding the situations as happened 
during the crisis, and most recently in the Cyprus banking crisis. But it will 
need to be a firm supervisor.27  
3.2 The third ignored pillar, harmonised deposit guarantee 
schemes 
The agreement reached in early 2014 on a further harmonisation of deposit 
guarantee schemes is often overlooked in the policy debates. It is indeed the 
case that no single deposit guarantee system was created, but an agreement 
was reached on a far-reaching harmonisation and update of the previous 
directives containing rules on pre-funding, the maximum pay-out deadlines 
and the functioning across borders. Again, none of this existed before, even 
considering the limited changes that were agreed upon in the early days of 
the financial crisis. 
Deposit guarantee schemes are an important building block for 
financial stability. By ensuring a generous level of protection, depositors 
should be motivated to entrust their money to banks and not to make a run 
on their bank. This assumes, however, that depositor protection schemes 
have the necessary funds available, and that they can be paid out rapidly, 
upon failure of the bank. The EU’s 1994 Directive undertook only a very 
limited form of harmonisation, i.e. it made a minimum level of €20,000 
                                                   
25 But interventions by deposit guarantee funds to reimburse depositors in 
accordance with member states’ obligations under the deposit guarantee schemes 
Directive do not constitute state aid (see banking Communication Art. 63). 
26 European Central Bank (2013a), ELA Procedures, 17 October 2013. 
27 See the ECB’s statement in the NYT article that the ECB had agreed with a €9 
billion ELA to Laiki Bank based on the assurance that the bank was solvent 
(www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141017_1.en.html). 
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coverage obligatory in the EU, but did not allow for competition between 
schemes, i.e. branches of host-country banks were not allowed to export 
more generous levels of protection, whereas branches of banks with home 
countries with lower levels of protection were allowed to top-up to the level 
of the host country. The failure of the Directive was clear with the start of the 
financial crisis, as in most cases states chose to bail-out banks, rather than 
liquidating them and letting the deposit protection system bail-out 
depositors. Hence the radical increase of the level of coverage to a maximum 
of €50,000 in October 2008, (and later €100,000) was intended to maintain 
financial stability.  
How necessary a common deposit guarantee scheme is for Banking 
Union remains a debatable question. Given the premise of Banking Union, 
breaking the vicious circle between the sovereigns and the banks, a common 
system should be an important element. Maintaining different contribution 
levels and forms of financing would maintain the vicious circle. However, 
the level of funds kept in all EU deposit insurance systems today remains 
very limited, and totals about €18.6 billion (2011), less than one-half the level 
that will be needed to have when the new directive is fully implemented.28 
In addition, only a few funds were effectively used during the crisis, in most 
cases; the state intervened directly to support banks. Hence other elements 
probably matter much more. 
The degree of harmonisation achieved by the 2014 recast of the 1994 
Directive is an important step forward. Although it does not introduce a 
single fund, it goes far enough to make deposit insurance systems a more 
important building block for financial stability in the EU and the EEA, at 
least over time. It establishes that within 10 years of this Directive’s 
publication, i.e. by July 2024, the available financial means of a DGS shall at 
least reach a target level of 0.8% of the amount of the covered deposits of its 
members (Art. 10) (see Table 4).29 In the event that bank deposits are declared 
unavailable, schemes need to cover up to €100,000 or the equivalent within 
seven working days (from 2024, 15 to 10 days during the transition), a ratio 
of one depositor per credit institution. In case the fund is not sufficient, it can 
call upon ex-post contributions (of 0.5% of the covered deposits), or it can 
borrow from the government or the market. 
                                                   
28 Presentation by Konrad Szelag, DG Market, European Commission, to the Task 
Force, 17 October 2014. 
29 The 0.8% could be lowered by the approval by the European Commission to 0.5%, 
if the banking sector is highly concentrated, which is not defined (see Art. 10.6). 
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As a step towards a common EU-wide fund, the Commission had 
introduced borrowing between funds, which proved to be a ‘hot potato’ 
during the discussions. The Directive allows for borrowing between funds, 
but on a voluntary basis, not exceeding 0.5% of covered deposits of the 
borrowing DGS, and subject to repayment within five years. For another 
problem, the treatment of deposits with branches, the text leaves this as the 
financial responsibility of the home member state of the bank, but the 
payment will take place through the DGS in the host member state, acting as 
a ‘single point of contact’ on behalf of the DGS in the home member state 
(Art. 14). For branches of third-country credit institutions, they must join a 
DGS in operation in a member state. 
The high level of protection, €100,000, is seen to be very high, especially 
for certain new member states, and is applied per depositor per bank (which 
may be individuals or enterprises). Hence the incentives on depositors to 
monitor the riskiness of the limited banks could be seen to contribute to 
moral hazard. The Directive, however, allows DGS to use their own risk-
based methods for determining and calculating the contributions by their 
members, taking due account of the risk profiles of the various business 
models, with the EBA proposing non-binding guidelines on technical 
aspects (Art. 13).  
The DGS Directive leaves an important backdoor open to the 
sovereign-bank nexus, i.e. it does not cover ‘contractual schemes’ or 
‘institutional protection schemes’ that are not officially recognised as DGS 
(Art. 1.3). This means that member states with additional generous 
protection schemes can decide to exclude them from the scope of the 
Directive, thus leaving an important distortion to the single market. 
Hence, within the SSM, depositor protection will remain decentralised, 
unlike the supervision of the significant banks and resolution. Considering 
that consumer protection remains a host-country responsibility in the SSM 
and the EU, this does not seem problematic, as the EU managed to agree on 
further harmonisation of the funding and functioning of depositor 
protection schemes. The crucial issue will be the link with resolution, and 
ensuring that resolution actions, particularly a call to the deposit insurance 
fund, are closely coordinated across the member states. It is not 
unimaginable under the current structure that reactions to a cross-border 
banking crisis will in practice unwind differently across the EU, even more 
so with a decentralised deposit insurance fund. The DGS Directive allows 
member states to use its funds for resolution, in the last instance to prevent 
a bank failure, and when certain conditions are met. But could this be 
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decided over a weekend, and will different member states take the same 
decision for their DGS? Under the BRRD, member states can still decide 
differently for a cross-border bank according to their financial stability 
concerns. This is less likely within the SSM with the SRM, although it 
remains possible that the SRM board will not agree.  
Table 4. Estimated euro-area Deposit Guarantee Scheme and Single Resolution 
Fund contributions 
June 2014 € bn % of total deposits 
Total deposits* 16,725  
Eligible** 10,508 63% 
Covered** 7,129 43% 
o/w SSM*** 53%  
Target level Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (DGS – 0.8% of covered 
deposits) 
57  
(o/w 30 banks 
supervised by the 
ECB) 
0.3% 
Target level Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF – 1.0% of covered deposits) 71 0.4% 
Total funds for reimbursement of 
deposits as well as recovery and 
resolution (target level – 1.8%) 
128 0.8% 
Notes: * Total of other deposits of MFIs excluding central banks as of June 2014. ** Estimated 
using the ratios from the impact assessment on the DGS. *** Estimated using the aggregate 
deposit figures as of December 2013 from the CEPS database on banking. 
Source: Joint Research Centre (2010), ECB (2014), European Commission (2014). 
3.3 Summing-up 
The new resolution framework is clear. All extraordinary public support for 
a bank that does not meet the required capital levels is subject to state aid 
rules, and can only come in after burden-sharing and bail-in rules have been 
applied. The difference between the current and the new rules is that bail-in 
can under the BRRD and SRM be extended to the senior debt holders, 
including depositors, above €100,000. It is only in exceptional circumstances, 
i.e. a serious disturbance in a national economy, that exceptions can be 
accepted.  
Experience is limited with bail-ins in the financial sector, and it was 
only applied on a large scale very late in the financial crisis, most importantly 
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in the resolution of some Spanish savings banks in November 2012, but also 
in Cyprus in 2013, and more recently in Slovenia, the Netherlands and in the 
BES case in Portugal. The question also arises how the new rules will be 
applied for cross-border banks that operate in several jurisdictions and 
under different models, and whether they would give rise to legal 
challenges.  
Following the EU rules on the subject, the ECB will for the time being 
only essentially use one prudential measure to assess a bank’s soundness, 
i.e. Common Equity Tier 1, as it did in the AQR, which gives banks and 
supervisors some room for manoeuvre in the short term. CET1 is a risk-
weighted capital standard, which allows for zero risk-weighting for 
government bonds and reduced weighting for property loans, or applies 
internal models for risk measurement, which for large European banks gives 
a low level of risk-weighted assets to total assets (see chapter 1). In addition, 
the ECB has other tools at its disposal to address temporary liquidity 
problems in the banking sector, as it did in 2012 with the LTRO, and with the 
measures it announced again on 5 June 2014.  
The consistent implementation of the new resolution framework will 
require hard work by supervisory and resolution authorities, and by 
financial institutions. Many member states still need to create an authority 
and set up a resolution fund. Banks will need to examine their balance sheets, 
check the amount of debt subject to bail-in and draft resolution plans. At EU 
level, we will soon witness a new element in the supervisory structure, with 
a single resolution authority for the SSM and later possibly for the almost 
entire EU, with the exception of two member states. 
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4. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
anking Union has been designed with the aim of breaking the bank-
sovereign nexus. This final chapter looks whether the design of the 
SSM, SRM and DGS provide sufficient assurance to make the banks 
less dependent on the strength of their home sovereign. It also explores 
several areas that offer room for improvement, including reporting and a 
potential revision of the supervisory structure in the years ahead. 
4.1 Safe to bank? 
When fully in place, the resolution and deposit guarantee schemes 
framework should provide a substantial buffer to cope with future banking 
crises, and a relief for the ECB at a time when it is taking over banking 
supervision. It should be seen in combination with all the different steps that 
have been taken over the last years to make banks safer and more resilient to 
withstand crises, but also to allow banks to fail, if necessary, in an organised 
way. The debate surrounding the presumed lack of a fiscal backstop needs 
to be qualified, as it does not take sufficiently into account all the layers of 
defence that exist to make the financial system more resilient. Experience 
will need to show whether all these different layers will effectively work. 
Hence, the work of the ECB within the SSM, and of the other supervisory 
and resolution authorities, is crucial in the years to come. 
The first layer of defence is a much better cushion to absorb losses, 
composed of a higher level of capital, under a tighter definition, as shown in 
Table 5. In addition, authorities can request macro-prudential and 
institution-specific capital buffers in different forms, such as for globally 
systemically important institutions. As this is measured on a risk-weighted 
basis, this will be complemented from 2018 onwards with a minimum 
leverage ratio. As soon as a bank falls below the 8% capital ratio, it will be 
requested to return to that level through an asset sale or rights issue, or move 
to a bail-in, which should happen smoothly if it is of a limited magnitude, 
although EU competition policy authorities will need to vet the transaction, 
following the BRRD rules.   
B
ECB BANKING SUPERVISION AND BEYOND | 57 
The question remains how a crisis in a large bank will be dealt with, or 
whether the funds in place are sufficient to cope with a large banking crisis. 
This is even more the case for the transition period until 2024, during which 
time the deposit insurance and resolution funds will not yet be fully funded. 
A large bail-in for a bank in excess of €1 trillion in assets will not be without 
effects on global capital markets. This will most likely be combined with the 
disposal of certain entities of the group, whereby the resolution and/or the 
deposit insurance fund will be called upon, causing further ripples in global 
financial markets. A €55 billion resolution fund is very small indeed, 
compared to the sums the US used for the TARP (initially $700 billion) or 
AIG in 2008. 
Table 5. Layers of defence for bank crisis 
 What minimum? Where and 
when? 
Before 
Capital 4.5% CET1, 6% incl. 
additional Tier 1 
capital, and 8% incl. 
Tier 2 capital, risk 
weighted  
Global, EU and 
EEA 
4% Tier 1 upon 
looser definition 
of capital, 8% 
total capital, risk 
weighted 
Capital add-ons 
and macro-
prudential 
buffer 
G-SIBs (up to +3.5% 
CET1), O-SIIs (up to 
+2% CET1), Capital 
Conservation buffer 
(+2.5% CET1), 
Countercyclical capital 
buffer (up to +2.5%  
CET1), and systemic 
risk buffer (>+1% risk-
weight).  
Global, EU and 
EEA 
Only in a few 
member states 
Leverage ratio 3%, non-risk weighted Global, EU and 
EEA expected 
from 2018 
onwards 
Not in EU 
Bail-in Minimum 8% of total 
liabilities and own 
funds  
EU and EEA, 
from 2016 
onwards 
Non-existent 
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Deposit 
guarantee 
schemes 
Pre-funding at 0.8% of 
covered deposits, max 
coverage €100,000 per 
depositor per bank 
EU and EEA, to 
be fully in place 
in 2024 at the 
latest 
Only €18.6 bn 
(2011) in DGS in 
the EU 
Resolution fund 1% of the amount of 
covered deposits; 
covering max 5% of 
liabilities in case of 
resolution 
EU and EEA, to 
be fully in place 
in 2024 at the 
latest 
Not existent 
Single 
resolution fund 
Pre-funding at 1.0% of 
covered deposits  
EMU and opt-
ins, to be fully 
in place in 2024 
at the latest 
Not existent 
European 
Stability 
Mechanism 
€55bn direct recap 
facility 
EMU, since June 
2014 
Not existent 
 
The ultimate backstop is the European Stability Mechanism at the EU, 
in case a bank has no clear national parent or a weak sovereign, but the 
amount the recapitalisation facility remains low. However, as the ESM is 
state funded, it could go, if necessary, much further. 
4.2 Looking ahead 
There will be no shortage of issues on the horizon for Banking Union, and 
the SSM specifically. Work on this may start soon, as by the end of 2015, the 
Commission will need to report on the application of the SSM regulation, as 
required by Art. 32. This concerns many issues, covering as well the 
functioning, effectiveness, governance, reach and compatibility with the 
broader single financial market. Several concerns were already discussed 
above. The ongoing ESA Review should be an opportunity to air some of 
these matters, but so far, the Commission reports on the subject have done 
so only to a limited degree, and have not discussed the problems related to 
the co-existence of the ESAs and the SSM, for example. Two key future 
challenges are supervisory disclosure and the institutional structure of 
supervision. 
4.2.1 Supervisory disclosure 
Supervisory disclosure has a broad meaning. It is as well related to the 
publication of supervisory information, the disclosure regarding the 
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supervisory tasks and its implementation, and more broadly the 
accountability of the supervisors. Further to Pillar 3 of the Basel framework, 
supervisory disclosure is already addressed in the CRDIV, and was the 
subject of an implementing technical standard of EBA. It is also addressed in 
several articles of the SSM Regulation, which mandates regular reporting to 
the European Parliament and national parliaments, and accountability of the 
chair or a member of the Supervisory Board before these bodies (Art. 20 and 
21 SSM Regulation). The ECB will, however, need to develop a standard in 
this regard, as there is no clear practice in the EU, more a multitude. Data 
availability, format, frequency and quality and style of reporting vary across 
member states. In some countries, the data are confidential, for which there 
is a legal or professional basis (see Gandrup et al., 2014). In others, they are 
public.  
The ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment and the latest EBA stress test 
have, according to the initial assessments, set a high standard in data 
reporting and formats, and managed to overwhelm the markets. Future 
experiences will need to indicate whether the data formats were sufficiently 
extensive and standardised, and whether the scenarios applied for the stress 
tests were sufficiently comprehensive.  
The ECB still has to provide more information on the practice of day-
to-day supervision, whether supervisory teams will be based in the head-
offices of the large banks, or whether supervision will take place through 
visits. In the same vein, the ECB should also indicate which supervisory 
information it will publish, and how rapidly. A practice that could be 
considered is the disclosure of supervisory information after supervisory 
visits, which has been applied in Denmark with positive results. 
4.2.2 Future structure of supervision 
The start of the SSM is a step towards a twin-peaks model in financial 
supervision in the EU, with prudential supervision centralised for the 
systemically important banks in the eurozone, and conduct of business 
supervision decentralised. Treaty Article 127(6) was an easy solution to 
move banking supervision to the ECB, but this should not stop the EU from 
debating future changes in the structure of supervision. Some issues have 
already been raised in the context of the interaction with the ESAs, and EBA 
in particular, but other matters also need to be on the agenda, such as the 
supervision of the insurance sector, the control of critical infrastructure and 
the streamlining of the structure overall. 
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A logical corollary of the SSM is to strengthen the cooperation in the 
EU among conduct of business supervisors. The competences of the ESAs 
regarding consumer and investor protection remain underexploited, and a 
wide diversity in protection levels and enforcement in the EU will call for 
more.  
Another institutional question is whether it is appropriate to have 
financial supervision under the same roof as the central bank. The debate on 
the subject has been raging for many years, and now, with the SSM, it has 
been decided in favour of the central bank. But the structure and functioning 
of the ECB in an EU context, the place of the SSM supervisory board in the 
ECB governance structure, but also the progress with EMU, and with the 
opt-ins in the SSM, mean that different options should be kept open for the 
future. 
4.3 Postscript: Has the sovereign-bank nexus been broken? 
Much of the above has been put in place to allow financial integration to re-
emerge, to level the playing field between banks in the euro area and in the 
single market as well as for the ECB’s monetary policy to work more 
effectively. Within SSM, Joint Supervisory Teams, and the de-coupling of 
nationality of the bank and the nationality of the chief supervisor should 
allow for less biased supervision. Through the BRRD and SRM, direct public 
support for the banking system will become much more difficult, and hence 
less dependent on the strength of the sovereign. But there are still important 
drawbacks. 
There are first the risks during the transition period, until many of the 
measures discussed above will come fully into effect. This concerns above all 
the backstops, such as a fully funded DGS and fully funded resolution funds, 
which will only reach their target levels in a few years’ time at the earliest. 
In the meantime other fall-back possibilities exist for troubled banks with 
weaker sovereigns, but their financing will remain fragile. The deposit base 
for Greek banks, for example, can be expected to remain stressed for some 
time. 
Secondly, the responses to the sovereign crisis differ markedly. Some 
of the embattled countries have recovered, while others still have to start. 
Hence further difficulties can be expected, even more as economic recovery 
in the Eurozone stalls and pressures on governments’ finances of many 
Eurozone governments continue.  
Thirdly, the ‘sovereign’ has kept important prerogatives as regulator, 
as discussed above. The SSM is the supervisor, but the member states remain 
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the regulators. This will not necessarily negatively affect the sovereign-bank 
doom loop, but certainly impact the level playing field.  
Banking Union will not be completed in one day. It will take a long and 
sustained effort to see the results. In early 2014, European financial 
integration stood at the levels of 2000, far below the levels reached in 2007, 
according to the ECB’s composite indicators, composed of cross-holdings by 
banks in money, bond and securities markets (ECB, 2014). Bank wholesale 
lending costs may have started to converge again, as a result of the actions 
of the ECB, but lending costs for businesses in southern Europe continue to 
differ considerably from the north. As can be seen from Figure 20, the 
lending cost in countries with higher sovereign borrowing costs are, on 
average, also higher.  
Figure 20. Governments’ borrowing costs and NFC lending rates 
 
Note: The interest rate on loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) is the monetary financial 
institutions’ (excluding the Eurosystem) interest rate on outstanding loans to NFCs up to one 
year, and the long-term government bond yields are the market yields of government bonds 
with maturities close to 10 years.  
Source: ECB (2014). 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Classification of the credit institutions and their branches 
The list of credit institutions and branches in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) is based on the list published by the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) and the credit institution list as of July 
2013 from Iceland’s financial service authority Fjármálaeftirlitsins. The 
merged list contained more than 8,250 credit institutions and branches. 
Around 60 on the ECB list of the credit institutions appeared to have merged, 
ceased to exist or have been resolved at the cut-off date (i.e. 31 December 
2012) and have therefore been removed from the final list. 
To assess the number of distinct banking groups in the EEA, 
ownership data of the credit institutions were gathered. The data on the 
majority owners were collected from annual reports and corporate websites 
as well as by inquiring of the credit institutions or their supervisors directly. 
Moreover, the data on cooperative and savings banks-networks were 
collected using the lists of member banks from the central institutions.  
For the analysis, the credit institutions were divided into four broad 
categories:  
• The first category of networks includes domestic credit institutions, 
which are subject to a joint liability scheme and/or strongly 
interconnected via shared operations, e.g. via centralised liquidity 
management and common branding. Besides local and central 
institutions, there are also domestic subsidiaries and branches of the 
banking network included in the detailed results of this category (e.g. 
the Dutch Rabobank group consists of 136 local banks that have a joint 
liability scheme and own the central institution, which is responsible 
for the supervision of the local banks). 
• The second category of parent institutions includes stand-alone credit 
institutions, parent institutions of banking groups and banking 
subsidiaries of non-financial companies in the EEA as well as credit 
institutions owned by entities established outside the EEA. The 
banking groups of non-banks can be presented in the results as 
multiple parent institutions in the country statistics when the banking 
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activities are held separately, while counted as single banking groups 
for the different country agglomerations. The banking groups that 
were acquired by national governments during the financial crisis and 
that are likely to remain separate from other government-owned banks 
are treated as separate banking groups. 
• The third category of subsidiaries is closely related to parent 
institutions. This category includes the credit institutions of which 
more than 50% of the shares are owned by parent institutions or 
subsidiaries of these institutions.  
• The fourth category of branches includes the foreign banking 
activities, which are an integral part of parent institutions or 
subsidiaries of EEA banks that have been granted a so-called ‘passport’ 
to conduct banking business in the EEA. It also includes branches of 
banks from non-EEA countries. Branches are primarily used for 
conducting activities across borders without a separate capital base. 
• There are some credit institutions that do not fit in one of the four main 
categories, i.e. credit institutions that are owned by the national central 
banks. And for others, no ownership information was publicly 
available. These remaining credit institutions in France, Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden have been kept in the analyses but 
are not categorised.  
In order to calculate the number of banking groups operating in a 
country, the credit institutions and branches are consolidated at network-
level and for ownership. The consolidation has further been applied to 
different regional aggregates as of December 2012, reflecting the European 
policy and supervisory levels. Latvia, which adopted the euro as of January 
2014, is included as a non-euro area EU country and Croatia, which joined 
the EU in January 2013, was excluded from the analysis. 
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Annex 2. Total credit institutions (CIs) in the EEA (2012) 
 CIs & branches Banking assets GDP Population 
 Nr % of EEA € bn % of EEA € bn % of EEA mil % of EEA 
Euro-area EU countries        
Austria 752 9.2 1,164 2.6 310 2.3 8 1.7 
Belgium 106 1.3 1,049 2.4 377 2.8 11 2.2 
Cyprus 137 1.7 113 0.3 18 0.1 0.9 0.2 
Estonia 17 0.2 21 0.0 17 0.1 1.3 0.3 
Finland 315 3.8 599 1.4 194 1.5 5 1.1 
France 677 8.3 6,810 15.4 2,028 15.2 65 12.8 
Germany 1,872 22.8 7,566 17.2 2,644 19.9 82 16.1 
Greece 52 0.6 409 0.9 194 1.5 11 2.2 
Ireland 472 5.8 999 2.3 164 1.2 5 0.9 
Italy 721 8.8 2,849 6.5 1,566 11.8 61 11.9 
Luxembourg 142 1.7 740 1.7 44 0.3 0.5 0.1 
Malta 27 0.3 54 0.1 7 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Netherlands 266 3.2 2,688 6.1 601 4.5 17 3.3 
Portugal 192 2.3 496 1.1 165 1.2 11 2.1 
Slovakia 28 0.3 56 0.1 71 0.5 5 1.1 
Slovenia 23 0.3 49 0.1 35 0.3 2 0.4 
Spain 314 3.8 3,884 8.8 1,050 7.9 46 9.1 
Subtotal 6,113 74.5 29,545 67.0 9,485 71.3 333 65.4 
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 CIs & branches Banking assets GDP Population 
 Nr % of EEA € bn % of EEA € bn % of EEA mil % of EEA 
Non-euro area EU countries       
Bulgaria 31 0.4 42 0.1 40 0.3 7 1.4 
Czech Republic 56 0.7 178 0.4 153 1.1 11 2.1 
Denmark 145 1.8 922 2.1 245 1.8 6 1.1 
Hungary 187 2.3 107 0.2 98 0.7 10 2.0 
Latvia 29 0.4 28 0.1 22 0.2 2 0.4 
Lithuania 94 1.1 22 0.0 33 0.2 3 0.6 
Poland 697 8.5 335 0.8 381 2.9 39 7.6 
Romania 42 0.5 83 0.2 132 1.0 21 4.2 
Sweden 176 2.1 1,632 3.7 408 3.1 9 1.9 
United Kingdom 394 4.8 10,617 24.1 1,901 14.3 63 12.4 
Subtotal 1,852 22.6 13,965 31.7 3,412 25.7 171 33.6 
Non-EU EEA countries        
Iceland 18 0.2 24 0.1 11 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Liechtenstein 16 0.2 46 0.1 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Norway 201 2.5 510 1.2 390 2.9 5 1.0 
Subtotal 235 2.9 579 1.3 405 3.0 5 1.0 
Total 8,200 100.0 44,090 100.0 13,302 100.0 509 100.0 
Source: AMECO, Central Bank of Iceland, EBA, ECB, Eurostat, Liechtenstein Amt für Statistik and Statistics Norway (2013). 
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Annex 3. Number of credit institutions in the EEA by category (2012) 
 Networks 
Parent 
institutions Subsidiaries  Branches Other Total 
Euro-area EU countries      
Austria 642 39 39 30 2 752 
Belgium 0 18 27 61 0 106 
Cyprus 97 5 8 27 0 137 
Estonia 0 3 5 9 0 17 
Finland 272 10 7 26 0 315 
France 231 125 217 67 37 677 
Germany 1,544 113 105 110 0 1,872 
Greece 14 11 5 22 0 52 
Ireland 400 4 33 35 0 472 
Italy 401 116 123 78 3 721 
Luxembourg 0 14 97 31 0 142 
Malta 0 12 14 1 0 27 
Netherlands 146 25 48 46 1 266 
Portugal 86 32 33 33 8 192 
Slovakia 0 5 9 14 0 28 
Slovenia 0 12 8 3 0 23 
Spain 67 47 109 84 7 314 
Subtotal 3,900 591 887 677 58 6,113 
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 Networks 
Parent 
institutions Subsidiaries  Branches Other Total 
Non-euro area EU countries     
Bulgaria 0 12 12 7 0 31 
Czech Republic 12 8 16 20 0 56 
Denmark 7 93 15 30 0 145 
Hungary 135 14 26 12 0 187 
Latvia 0 11 9 9 0 29 
Lithuania 63 19 3 9 0 94 
Poland 629 12 31 25 0 697 
Romania 0 6 27 9 0 42 
Sweden 63 53 23 32 5 176 
United Kingdom 0 99 156 139 0 394 
Subtotal* 909 328 318 292 5 1,852 
Non-EU EEA countries      
Iceland 8 8 2 0 0 18 
Liechtenstein 1 11 4 0 0 16 
Norway 105 36 18 42 0 201 
Subtotal 114 55 24 42 0 235 
Total 4,923 974 1,229 1,011 63 8,200 
Note: * The EIB is following the ECB list established in the EU and belongs therefore not to an individual country. In the aggregates it is 
included under Credit Institutions. 
Source: Authors. 
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Annex 4. Total banking groups active in the EEA by category (2012) 
 
Networks Parent institutions Subsidiaries Branches Other Total 
Branches 
excl. from 
supervision 
Supervised 
institutions 
Euro-area EU countries         
Austria 11 39 17 26 1 94 26 68 
Belgium 0 16 14 44 0 74 43 31 
Cyprus 1 5 8 25 0 39 14 25 
Estonia 0 3 5 9 0 17 9 8 
Finland 3 10 3 21 0 37 21 16 
France 3 107 77 45 37 269 43 226 
Germany 22 110 61 67 0 260 65 195 
Greece 1 11 3 19 0 34 18 16 
Ireland 1 4 23 23 0 51 22 29 
Italy 3 116 17 51 3 190 50 140 
Luxembourg 0 14 76 12 0 102 11 91 
Malta 0 12 12 1 0 25 1 24 
Netherlands 1 25 17 34 1 78 33 45 
Portugal 1 32 11 25 8 77 23 54 
Slovakia 0 4 8 11 0 23 11 12 
Slovenia 0 12 7 2 0 21 2 19 
Spain 2 47 24 46 7 126 45 81 
Subtotal 49 567 383 461 57 1,517 437 1,080 
Consolidation 0 -22 -236 -394 0 -652 -390 -262 
Banking groups 49 545 147 67 57 865 47 818 
ECB BANKING SUPERVISION AND BEYOND | 73 
 Networks 
Parent 
institutions Subsidiaries Branches Other Total 
Branches excl. from 
supervision 
Supervised 
institutions 
Non-euro area EU countries        
Bulgaria 0 12 12 7 0 31 7 24 
Czech Republic 1 8 9 19 0 37 19 18 
Denmark 1 93 4 23 0 121 23 98 
Hungary 1 14 19 7 0 41 7 34 
Latvia 0 11 9 6 0 26 6 20 
Lithuania 1 19 3 8 0 31 8 23 
Poland 3 11 24 18 0 56 18 38 
Romania 0 6 23 8 0 37 8 29 
Sweden 1 51 8 27 5 92 27 65 
United Kingdom 0 96 103 87 0 286 57 229 
Subtotal 8 322 214 210 5 759 180 579 
Consolidation 0 -5 -69 -128 0 -202 -128 -74 
Banking groups 8 317 145 82 5 557 52 505 
Non-EU EEA countries         
Iceland 1 8 0 0 0 9 0 9 
Liechtenstein 1 11 4 0 0 16 0 16 
Norway 2 34 2 36 0 74 33 41 
Subtotal 4 53 6 36 0 99 33 66 
Consolidation -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 
Banking groups 3 53 6 36 0 98 33 65 
All EEA countries         
Subtotal 61 942 603 707 62 2,375 650 1,725 
Consolidation -1 -37 -404 -656 -3 -1,101 -650 -451 
Banking groups 60 905 199 51 59 1,274 0 1,274 
Note: The EIB is following the ECB credit institution-list established in the EU and therefore belongs not to an individual country, but to the EU. 
Source: Authors. 
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Annex 5. Supervised banking groups in the euro area by 
supervisor (2012) 
 
Nationally 
supervised 
(before 
SSM) 
ECB  
(HQ) 
Nationally 
supervised 
(excl. SSM) 
FSB  
(HQ) 
EBA  
(HQ) 
Euro-area EU countries     
Austria 68 14 (6) 54 4 (0) 13 (6) 
Belgium 31 13 (5) 18 7 (0) 11 (4) 
Cyprus 25 10 (3) 15 2 (0) 9 (3) 
Estonia 8 2 (0) 6 0 (0) 3 (0) 
Finland 16 3 (1) 13 1 (0) 4 (1) 
France 226 21 (9) 205 17 (4) 23 (11) 
Germany 195 33 (20) 162 17 (1) 37 (23) 
Greece 16 6 (4) 10 1 (0) 6 (4) 
Ireland 29 11 (3) 18 10 (0) 13 (3) 
Italy 140 20 (13) 120 11 (1) 22 (15) 
Luxembourg 91 35 (1) 56 21 (0) 39 (1) 
Malta 24 10 (1) 14 4 (0) 10 (1) 
Netherlands 45 13 (6) 32 10 (1) 13 (6) 
Portugal 54 10 (4) 44 5 (0) 9 (3) 
Slovakia 12 6 (0) 6 1 (0) 6 (0) 
Slovenia 19 8 (2) 11 2 (0) 8 (3) 
Spain 81 25 (15) 56 10 (2) 25 (15) 
Subtotal 1,080 240 (93) 840 123 (9) 251 (99) 
Consolidation -262 -129 (0) -75 -95 (0) -140 (0) 
Banking groups 818 111 (93) 765 28 (9) 111 (99) 
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Nationally 
supervised 
(before SSM) 
ECB 
(HQ) 
Nationally 
supervised 
(excl. SSM) 
FSB 
(HQ) 
EBA 
(HQ) 
Non-euro EU area countries    
Bulgaria 24 0 (0) 24 3 (0) 10 (0) 
Czech Republic 18 0 (0) 18 2 (0) 7 (0) 
Denmark 98 0 (1) 98 2 (0) 7 (4) 
Hungary 34 0 (0) 34 4 (0) 12 (1) 
Latvia 20 4 (1) 16 1 (0) 5 (1) 
Lithuania 23 0 (0) 23 0 (0) 3 (0) 
Poland 38 0 (0) 38 12 (0) 24 (4) 
Romania 29 0 (0) 29 5 (0) 17 (0) 
Sweden 65 0 (3) 65 2 (1) 6 (4) 
United 
Kingdom 229 0 (3) 229 23 (4) 13 (4) 
Subtotal 579 4 (8) 575 54 (5) 104 (18) 
Consolidation -74 -1 (0) -73 -25 (0) -54 (0) 
Banking groups 505 3 (8) 502 29 (5) 50 (18) 
Non-EU EEA countries     
Iceland 9 0 (0) 9 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Liechtenstein 16 0 (0) 16 0 (0) 2 (0) 
Norway 41 0 (0) 41 2 (0) 3 (1) 
Subtotal 66 0 (0) 66 2 (0) 5 (1) 
Consolidation -1 0 (0) -1 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Banking groups 65 0 (0) 65 2 (0) 5 (1) 
All EEA countries     
Subtotal 1,725 244 (101) 1,481 179 (14) 360 (118) 
Consolidation -451 -130 (0) -321 -149 (0) -238 (0) 
Banking groups 1,274 114 (101) 1,160 30 (14) 122 (118) 
Note: HQ = the number of banking groups with their group headquarters in the area. Hence, 
there are three subsidiaries of Swedish SEB Group and two subsidiaries of English HSBC and 
Royal Bank of Scotland as well as Swedish Swedbank among the 115 banks supervised by the 
ECB.    
The EIB is following the ECB credit institution-list established in the EU and therefore belongs 
not to an individual country, but to the EU. 
Source: Authors. 
76 | ANNEXES 
Annex 6. Key statistics on banks supervised by the ECB (2013) 
Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
Aareal Bank AG (DE) 43.0 2.5 0.6% | 0.2% .. .. 
ABLV Bank (LV) 2.3 0.1 8.1% | 0% .. .. 
ABN Amro (NL) 372.0 13.6 15.3% | 1.4% The State of the Netherlands (100) 
The State of the 
Netherlands (100) 
Allied Irish Banks (IE) 117.7 10.5 14.9% | 0.4% Republic of Ireland (99.8) Republic of Ireland (99.8) 
Alpha Bank (GR) 73.7 8.4 20% | 0.3% Greek government via HFSF (81.7) 
Greek government via 
HFSF (83.7) 
ApoBank (DE) 34.7 1.8 0.5% | 0.1% .. .. 
Argenta (BE) 35.4 1.5 3.7% | 0.1% Investar NV (85.8) .. 
AS SEB banka (LV) 3.0 0.3 10.4% | 0% Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (100) .. 
AXA Bank Europe (BE) 39.2* 0.8* 4.1% | 0.2% AXA SA (100) .. 
Banca Carige SpA (IT) 42.2 1.6 1.6% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di 
Siena (IT) 199.1 6.2 7.6% | 0.7% .. .. 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia 
Romagna (IT) 61.8 4.7 2.4% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banca Popolare di Milano 
SCaRL (IT) 49.4 3.6 1.9% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio 
(IT) 32.8 2.1 1.3% | 0.1% .. .. 
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Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
(IT) 45.2 3.6 1.7% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banco BPI (PT) 42.7 2.3 9.3% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banco Popolare (IT) 126.0 8.5 4.8% | 0.5% .. .. 
Banco Popular Español (ES) 147.9 11.9 4.2% | 0.6% .. .. 
Banco Sabadell (ES) 163.4 10.2 4.7% | 0.6% .. .. 
Banco Santander (ES) 1,115.6 79.9 32% | 4.2% .. .. 
Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten NV (NL) 131.2 3.4 5.4% | 0.5% Staat der Nederlanden (50) Staat der Nederlanden (50) 
Bank of Cyprus (CY) 30.3 2.7 45% | 0.1% .. .. 
Bank of Ireland (IE) 132.1 7.9 16.7% | 0.5% .. Republic of Ireland (14) 
Bank of New York Mellon 
SA/NV (BE) 54* 1.9* 5.6% | 0.2% 
The Bank of New York 
Mellon Corporation (100) .. 
Bank of Valletta (MT) 7.3 0.6 14.5% | 0% .. Government of Malta (25.2) 
Bankinter (ES) 55.1 3.4 1.6% | 0.2% .. .. 
Banque degroof (BE) 5.3 0.7 0.6% | 0% 
Cobepa SA/NV - CLdN 
Finance SA - Philippson - 
Siaens - Schockert and 
Haegelsteen families (62.9) 
.. 
Banque Et Caisse 
D'Epargne De L'Etat (LU) 40.7 3.7 5.7% | 0.2% 
Luxembourg Government 
(100) 
Luxembourg Government 
(100) 
Barclays PLC (IT) **** 20.6 .. 0.8% | 0.1% Barclays PLC (100) .. 
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Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
BAWAG PSK Group (AT) 36.4 2.8 3.3% | 0.1% Cerberus Capital Management (51.8) .. 
Bayerische Landesbank 
(DE) 255.6 14.9 3.8% | 1% Free State of Bavaria (75) Free State of Bavaria (75) 
BBVA (ES) 582.6 46.3 16.7% | 2.2%  .. 
Belfius (BE) 182.8 6.6 19% | 0.7% 
NV Federale Participatie- 
en 
investeringsmaatschappij 
(99.99) 
NV Federale Participatie- 
en 
investeringsmaatschappij 
(99.99) 
BFA-Bankia (ES) 251.5 11.0 7.2% | 0.9% Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (68.4) .. 
BNP Paribas (FR) 1,800.1 91.2 28.4% | 6.7% .. 
Société Fédérale de 
Participations et 
d’Investissement (10.3) 
BPCE Group (FR) 1,123.5 58.2 17.7% | 4.2%  .. 
BPI-Groupe (FR) 30.8* 2.8* 0.5% | 0.1% Republique Francaise (100) Republique Francaise (100) 
Caisse de Refinancement de 
l'Habitat (FR) 53.1 0.3 0.8% | 0.2% .. .. 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
(PT) 113.0 6.8 24.5% | 0.4% Portuguese State (100) Portugues State (100) 
CAJAMAR (ES) 42.1 2.8 1.2% | 0.2% .. .. 
Catalunya Banc (ES) 63.1 2.5 1.8% | 0.2% Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (66) 
Fondo de Reestructuración 
Ordenada Bancaria (66.0); 
Fondo de Garantia de 
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Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
Depositos de Entidades de 
Credito (32.4) 
Commerzbank (DE) 549.7 26.9 8.2% | 2.1% .. German federal state (17) 
Co-operative Central Bank 
Ltd (CY) 4.6* 0.2* 6.8% | 0% .. .. 
Crédit Agricole S.A. (FR) 1,536.9 47.9 24.2% | 5.7% SAS Rue la Boétie (56.3) .. 
Crédit Mutuel Group (FR) 658.6 41.2 10.4% | 2.5% .. .. 
Danske Bank Finland (FI) 26.7 2.4 5.1% | 0.1% Danske Bank A/S (100) .. 
Dekabank (DE) 116.1 3.8 1.7% | 0.4% 
DSGV ö.K. (50) / Deka 
Erwerbsgesellschaft mbH 
& Co. KG (50) 
.. 
Deutsche Bank (DE) 1,611.4 54.7 23.9% | 6% .. .. 
Dexia (BE) 222.9 4.0 23.2% | 0.8% Belgian Federal State - SFPI (50) 
French State - APE/SPPE 
(44.4); Belgian Federal 
State - SFPI (50) 
DZ Bank (DE) 387.0 14.2 5.8% | 1.5% Cooperative Enterprises (95.9) .. 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias 
(GR) 77.6 4.5 21% | 0.3% 
Greek government via 
HFSF (95.2) 
Greek government via 
HFSF (95.2) 
Erste Bank (AT) 199.9 14.8 18.3% | 0.8% .. .. 
Grupo BMN (ES) 47.5 2.1 1.4% | 0.2% Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (65) 
Fondo de Reestructuración 
Ordenada Bancaria (65) 
HASPA Finanzholding 
(DE) 40.5 2.2 0.6% | 0.2% .. .. 
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Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
Helaba (DE) 178.1 7.1 2.6% | 0.7% 
Savings Banks and Giro 
Association of Hesse-
Thuringia (68.9) 
Federal State of Hesse (8.1) 
Hellenic Bank Public 
Company Limited (CY) 6.4 0.4 9.5% | 0% .. .. 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc (MT) 5.7 0.4 11.4% | 0% HSBC Europe (70) .. 
HSBC France (FR) 208.9 5.4 3.3% | 0.8% HSBC Group (99.99) .. 
HSH Nordbank (DE) 109.0 4.5 1.6% | 0.4% 
HSH Finanzfonds AoR - 
Joint institution of both 
states (65) 
HSH Finanzfonds AoR - 
Joint institution of both 
states (65); Federal City of 
Hamburg (10.80); Federal 
State of Schleswig-
Holstein (9.58) 
Hypo Real Estate (DE) 122.5 6.3 1.8% | 0.5% Federal Republic of Germany SoFFin (100) 
Federal Republic of 
Germany SoFFin (100) 
IberCaja (ES) 63.1 2.6 1.8% | 0.2% 
Caja de Ahorros y Monte 
de Piedad de Zaragoza - 
Aragon y Rioja (100) 
.. 
Iccrea (IT) 40* 1.5* 1.5% | 0.2% .. .. 
ING (NL) 1,080.6 52.8 44.4% | 4% .. .. 
Intesa Sanpaolo (IT) 626.3 45.1 23.8% | 2.3% .. .. 
KBC (BE) 241.3 14.5 25.1% | 0.9% .. .. 
Kutxa (ES) 60.8 4.9 1.7% | 0.2% 
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, 
Aurrezki Kutxa eta  
Bahitetxea (57) 
.. 
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Bank 
Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
Total 
equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
La Banque Postale (FR) 200.2 7.0 3.2% | 0.8% Le groupe La Poste (100) Le groupe La Poste (100) 
La Caixa (ES) 351.3 16.5 10.1% | 1.3% Obra social La Caixa   (64.37) .. 
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg (DE) 273.5 13.4 4.1% | 1% .. 
State of  Baden-
Württemberg (24.99); The 
state capital Stuttgart 
(18.93); 
Landesbeteiligungen  
Baden- Württemberg 
GmbH (13.54) 
Landesbank Berlin (DE) 102.4 2.3 1.5% | 0.4% 
Erwerbsgesellschaft der S-
Finanzgruppe mbH & Co. 
KG (89.37 + 10.63 via 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
der S-Finanzgruppe mbH 
& Co. KG) 
.. 
Landwirtschaftliche 
Rentenbank (DE) 81.9 3.2 1.2% | 0.3% .. .. 
L-Bank (DE) 70.7 2.6 1.1% | 0.3% State of Baden-Württemberg (100) 
State of Baden-
Württemberg (100) 
Liberbank (ES) 44.5 1.6 1.3% | 0.2% .. .. 
Mediobanca SpA (IT) 72.8 7.3 2.8% | 0.3% .. .. 
Millennium BCP (PT) 82.0 3.3 17.8% | 0.3% .. .. 
MünchenerHyp (DE) 34.9 0.9 0.5% | 0.1% .. .. 
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Total 
assets 
(€ bn) 
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equity  
(€ bn) 
Market share  
(% of total banking assets 
domestic|euro area)*** 
Majority shareholders 
(>50%) 
Government ownership 
(EU governments, >5%) 
National Bank of Greece 
(GR) 110.9 7.9 30% | 0.4% 
Greek government via 
HFSF (84.4) 
Greek government via 
HFSF (84.4) 
Banesco Holding Hispania 
(ES)***** 52.7 2.7 1.5% | 0.2% 
Banesco Holding 
Financiero (88.3) .. 
Nederlandse 
Waterschapsbank NV (NL) 73.0 1.3 3% | 0.3% .. 
Fryslan Water Board 
(6.56); Hollands 
Noorderkwartier Water 
Board (8.7); Rivierenland 
Water Board (7.86); Rijn en 
Ijssel Water Board (11.22); 
Rijnland Water Board 
(9.62); Scheldestromen 
Water Board (8.677); Velt 
en Vecht Water Board 
(12.88) 
Norddeutsche Landesbank 
(DE) 200.8 8.2 3% | 0.8% 
Federal State of Lower 
Saxony (59.13) 
Federal State of Lower 
Saxony (59.13); Federal 
State of Saxony-Anhalt 
(5.57) 
Nordea Bank Finland (FI) 304.8 9.5 58.4% | 1.1% Nordea Group (100) .. 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor (SI) 4.8 0.6 11.2% | 0% Republic of Slovenia (91.2) Republic of Slovenia (91.2) 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka 
(SI) 12.5 1.3 29% | 0.1% Republic of Slovenia (100) Republic of Slovenia (100) 
Novo Banco, SA (PT) 84.8 6.7 18.4% | 0.3%  .. 
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NRW.BANK (DE) 145.4 17.9 2.2% | 0.5% State of North Rhine-Westphalia (100) 
State of North Rhine-
Westphalia (100) 
Oesterreichische Volksbank 
(AT) 20.9 1.2 1.9% | 0.1% 
Volksbanken Holding 
eGen (51.6) Republic of Austria (43.3) 
OP-Pohjola (FI) 101.0 7.7 19.4% | 0.4% .. .. 
Permanent TSB (IE) 37.6 2.4 4.8% | 0.1% Republic of Ireland (99) Republic of Ireland (99) 
Piraeus Bank (GR) 92.0 8.5 24.9% | 0.3% Greek government via HFSF (67) 
Greek government via 
HFSF (67) 
Precision Capital (LU) 34.5* 2.3* 4.8% | 0.1% .. .. 
Rabobank (NL) 674.1 44.1 27.7% | 2.5% .. .. 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Österreich AG (AT) 147.3 11.8 13.5% | 0.6% 
Raiffeisen Landesbanken 
Holding GmbH (82.4) .. 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Niederösterreich-Wien AG 
(AT) 
29.1 2.8 2.7% | 0.1% 
Raiffeisen Holding 
Niederösterreich-Wien AG 
(78.5) 
.. 
Raiffeisenlandesbank 
Oberösterreich AG (AT) 37.4 3.5 3.4% | 0.1% 
Raiffeisenbankengruppe 
OÖ Verbund eingetragene 
Genossenschaft (51.2) 
.. 
RBC Investor Services Bank 
S.A. (LU) 11.7* 0.8* 1.6% | 0% 
Royal Bank of Canada 
(100) .. 
Russian Commercial Bank 
(Cyprus) Ltd (CY) 8.2 0.3 12.1% | 0.03% JSC VTB Bank (60) .. 
Sberbank Europe AG (AT) 12.4** .. 1.1% | 0.1% Sberbank (100) .. 
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SEB AG (DE) 31.8 2.1 0.5% | 0.1% Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (100) .. 
SEB Pank (EE) 4.4 0.8 21.2% | 0% Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (100) .. 
SNS Reaal (NL) 124.6 4.5 5.1% | 0.5% NL Financial Investments (100) 
NL Financial Investments 
(100) 
Société de Financement 
Local (FR) 80.0 1.4 1.3% | 0.3% Republique Francaise (75) 
Republique Francaise(75); 
Caisse des Depots et 
Consignations (20); La 
Banque Postale (5) 
Société Générale (FR) 1,235.3 51.0 19.5% | 4.6% .. .. 
State Street Bank 
Luxembourg (LU) 7.5* 2.7* 1.1% | 0% 
State Street Corporation 
(100) .. 
Swedbank As (EE) 3.6 0.7 12.3% | 0% Swedbank AB (100) .. 
Swedbank AS (LV) 8.9 1.9 42.7% | 0% Swedbank AB (99.9) .. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 
NV (NL) 39.8 2.9 1.6% | 0.2% 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc (97.72) 
Solicitor For The Affairs of 
Her Majesty's Treasury as 
Nominee for Her Majesty's 
Treasury (63.9) 
UBI Banca (IT) 124.2 10.3 4.7% | 0.5% .. .. 
UBS (Luxembourg) SA (LU) 9.3* 0.6* 1.3% | 0% UBS Group (100) .. 
Ulster Bank Ireland Limited 
(IE) 40.2 4.1 5.1% | 0.2% 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc (100) 
Solicitor For The Affairs of 
Her Majesty's Treasury as 
Nominee for Her Majesty's 
Treasury (63.9) 
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Unicaja Banco (ES) 41.2 2.1 1.2% | 0.2% .. .. 
UniCredit (IT) 845.8 50.2 32.2% | 3.2% .. .. 
Veneto Banca (IT) 31.4 2.9 1.2% | 0.1% .. .. 
Volkswagen Financial 
Services AG (DE) 91.0 8.8 1.4% | 0.3% Volkswagen AG (100) .. 
VTB Bank (Austria) (AT) 10.3 0.8 1% | 0% JSC VTB Bank (100) .. 
WGZ Bank (DE) 90.9 3.3 1.4% | 0.3% 
Mitgliedinstitute der 
regionalen FinanzGruppe 
(97.75) 
.. 
Total 22,311 1,159 1,129.5% | 83.4% 63 36 
Notes: * 2012 figures. ** July 2014 figures. *** Estimates using ECB Consolidated Banking Database figures to determine the market size. **** Barclays PLC on 
balance sheet exposure to Italy. ***** NCG Banco figures. 
Source: Authors. 
Dana Andreicut 
Policy advisor on economic, monetary affairs and international trade 
Office of Danuta Hübner, MEP 
European Parliament 
.
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